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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over the appropriate allocation of authority be-
tween the state and national governments has spanned the life
of the Republic.' The Supreme Court, urged on by neo-
federalist commentators, 2 has recently renewed its episodic
quest to secure a meaningful role in that debate. After more
than fifty years spent largely on the sidelines, the Court has
reentered the fray, seeking to enforce a commitment to feder-
alism on several fronts, most notably placing limits on Con-
gress's commerce power in United States v. Lopez3 and carving
out protection for state autonomy in New York v. United States4
and Printz v. United States.5 The Court's search for a judicially
enforceable federalism springs in part from two convictions:
first, that there is value in state-level norm-setting; and sec-
ond, that Congress has demonstrated that it cannot be trusted
to leave suitable decisions to the states. While both convictions
may harbor considerable truth, the lines drawn in Lopez, New
York and Printz are unsupported by constitutional text, struc-
1. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Justice
Marshall stated that "the question respecting the extent of the powers actu-
ally granted [to the national government by the Constitution], is perpetually
arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist."
Id. at 405. Writing to a European audience in 1888, Lord James Bryce ob-
served: "All Americans have long been agreed that the only possible form of
government for their country is a Federal one.... But regarding the nature of
the Federal tie that ought to exist there have been keen and frequent contro-
versies .... " 1 JAMEs BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONwEALTH 453 (1888).
More recently, Justice O'Connor described "discerning the proper division of
authority between the Federal Government and the States" as "perhaps our
oldest question of constitutional law." New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 149 (1992).
2. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV.
752 (1995).
3. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Lopez, decided in 1995, marked the first time the
Court had struck down a federal law as beyond the commerce power since
1936. See Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARv. L. REV. 13, 15(1995) (identifying Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), as the last
such ruling prior to Lopez).
4. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
5. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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ture or history. Moreover, they neither meaningfully promote
state-level norm-setting nor protect against congressional
usurpation of decisions that states are more competent to
make. In short, the Court's current search for doctrine that
would meaningfully promote federalism values, while under-
standable and perhaps well-motivated, has been a failure.
The contemporary debate over federalism, particularly
among legal academics, has centered on whether and to what
extent the Supreme Court must act to protect the states. One
school of thought contends that states need no judicial protec-
tion from national legislation, because states have a sufficient
role in the national political process to protect themselves.
This theory, first offered by Herbert Wechsler 6 and later elabo-
rated by Jesse Choper,7 found its judicial voice in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.8 The contrary view,
that adequate protection for state interests requires vigorous
judicial review in federalism cases,9 had a brief run after Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery'0 and now again is ascendant.
The advocates of vigorous judicial review rightly observe that
without such review, the Supremacy Clause grants federal
policymakers complete control over the balance of power be-
tween the state and national governments. 1 The opponents of
vigorous judicial review rightly observe that despite largely un-
fettered control for more than sixty years, the national gov-
ernment has not overrun the states. What both camps (and
the Supreme Court) tend to ignore, however, is that federalism
6. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern-
ment, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
7. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JuDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PO-
LITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power
Vis-d-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552,
1560-77 (1977).
8. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
9. For criticisms of Wechsler and particularly Choper, see, for example,
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION As POLITICAL STRUCTURE 23-62
(1995); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federal-
ism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994); William W. Van Alstyne, The Second
Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985).
10. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Tran-
sit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
11 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) ("[The Su-
premacy Clause gives the Federal Government 'a decided advantage in th[e]
delicate balance' the Constitution strikes between state and federal power.")
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
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is not simply about protecting the states from national en-
croachment. It is also about empowering the national govern-
ment to act where appropriate. After all, American federalism
was invented as a means of creating a more effective (and nec-
essarily more powerful) national government than existed un-
der the Articles of Confederation.
The great insight of federalism is that different levels of
government have different competencies, and that wisely allo-
cating responsibilities to those different levels of government
can work significant benefits in terms of both citizen satisfac-
tion and governmental efficiency. Federalism's great question,
then, is not how to protect the states but how to create the con-
ditions necessary to promote wise allocation decisions. At bot-
tom, federalism is about institutional choice, about deciding
what level of government gets to decide what issues.12 But the
debate over judicial enforcement of federalism is also about in-
stitutional choice-about who gets to make federalism's alloca-
tion decisions. This Article critically examines the Supreme
Court's recent efforts to be a player in the contemporary feder-
alism debate, and takes the position that few if any normative
disputes about the desirable allocation of governmental power
ought to be resolved by the courts. Indeed, the contemporary
search for a judicially enforceable federalism has been not only
irrelevant but also potentially counterproductive to the impor-
tant and complex task of rationally allocating authority among
national, state and local governments.
Part II of the Article examines the Supreme Court's search
for a judicially enforceable federalism, looking briefly at deci-
sions in the early part of this century and then concentrating
on Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment cases decided
from National League of Cities v. Usery13 in 1976 through
Printz v. United States14 in 1997. This examination reveals a
Court that has been casting about for meaningful limits on na-
tional authority without linking those limits either to constitu-
tional text, structure, or history, or to the pragmatic advance-
ment of federalism values. Along the way, the Court has
12. For a conceptually sophisticated discussion of the importance of (and
techniques for) comparing institutions' relative capacities for different types of
decisionmaking, see NEIL K KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOsING
INSTITUTIONs IN LAW, ECONOMICs, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
13. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Tran-
sit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
14. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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bounced back and forth between active and passive roles, ag-
gressively protecting "States as States" in National League of
Cities, then declaring in Garcia its intent to leave federalism to
the political process, then undermining the conceptual under-
pinnings of that declaration to the point that Garcia has been
effectively overruled. Part H concludes by considering why the
Court, despite repeated failures, continues to be drawn to the
alluring flame of a judicially enforced federalism. Part III then
turns to explore whether and to what extent, despite the
Court's failures both of doctrine and justification, there re-
mains a meaningful judicial role with respect to the definition
and enforcement of federalism.
II. THE RENEWED SEARCH FOR A JUDICIALLY
ENFORCEABLE FEDERALISM
In the early part of this century, the Supreme Court as-
sumed a substantial role in determining the appropriate rela-
tive roles of the state and national governments in the Ameri-
can federal system.15 The Court's interest in protecting private
property rights, coupled with a strong sense of impregnable
state power, led to a series of decisions designed to assure that
private property rights be as free as possible from national
government regulation. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,16 for exam-
ple, the Court struck down a federal statute that prohibited the
interstate transportation of goods manufactured by child labor.
Justice Day's majority opinion emphasized the separate
spheres of national and state responsibility:
The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate
commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not give it
authority to control the States in their exercise of the police power
over local trade and manufacture.
15. The Supreme Court's role in resolving confrontations between na-
tional and state power dates back to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Until
the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Court's Commerce Clause deci-
sions did not address the authority of Congress to legislate because for the
most part "Congress seldom perceived the necessity to exercise its power in
circumstances where its authority would be called into question." United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 569 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The
Court instead "faced the related but quite distinct question of the authority of
the States to regulate matters that would be within the commerce power had
Congress chosen to act." Id.




The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not in-
tended to destroy the local power always existing and carefully re-
served to the States in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. 7
Perhaps the high water mark for judicial protection of private
property rights from national regulation, Hammer v. Dagen-
hart echoed the state sovereignty approach to limiting federal
power found in earlier cases like United States v. E.C. Knight
Co.,18 which treated the Tenth Amendment as prohibiting fed-
eral encroachment on certain state authority such as the police
power. Later cases, like Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Railroad Co.,19 ALA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,20 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,21 reaffirmed the Court's
strong interest in both defining and policing the line that the
national government could not cross. In so doing, these cases
embraced "dual federalism," the "idea that certain subject-
17. Id. at 273-74.
18. 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that application of the Sherman Act to mo-
nopoly in manufacture of sugar would violate the Constitution by encroaching
on state police power).
19. 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (striking down compulsory pension scheme for
railroad workers as beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
In Railroad Retirement Board, the government argued that railroad efficiency
is a legitimate matter for Commerce Clause regulation, and that a guaranteed
pension promotes morale and thus efficiency. In language that would be ech-
oed sixty years later by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez, Justice Roberts re-
sponded to this argument as follows:
Provision for free medical attendance and nursing, for clothing, for
food, for housing, for the education of children, and a hundred other
matters, might with equal propriety be proposed as tending to relieve
the employee of mental strain and worry. Can it fairly be said that
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to the
prescription of any or all of these things? Is it not apparent that they
are really and essentially related solely to the social welfare of the
worker, and therefore remote from any regulation of commerce as
such? We think the answer is plain. These matters obviously lie out-
side the orbit of Congressional power.
295 U.S. at 368.
20. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that the wages and hours of employees of
a New York slaughterhouse and in-state sale of poultry were purely local mat-
ters not subject to regulation by the national government).
21. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). Carter Coal concerned the constitutionality of
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, which taxed the sale of coal
but granted a tax reduction to coal companies that agreed to wage and hour
regulation for their workers. The Court held that the Act was not a tax but a
penalty, and therefore outside Congress's taxing power. See id. at 288-89. In
addition, the Court concluded that the Act was not supported by the Com-
merce Clause because mining, like manufacturing, was not interstate com-
merce. See id. at 302.
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matters were... segregated to the States and hence could not
be reached by any valid exercise of national power."22
Beginning in 1937, however, the Court decided a series of
cases in which it effectively abandoned any serious effort to
protect the states from the nation. In NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.,24 the Court dramatically broadened its
reading of Congress's Commerce Clause power and upheld na-
tional regulation of unfair labor practices. According to the
Court's new majority:
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to inter-
state commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to pro-
tect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot
be denied the power to exercise that control.n
In United States v. Darby,26 the Court overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart27 and expressly rejected the idea that the Tenth
Amendment imposed any aff ative limits on congressional
authority.28 Wickard v. Filburn,29 decided a year after Darby,
abandoned the doctrine that agricultural production was not
commerce and reaffirmed the aggregation principle established
in Jones & Laughlin Steel and Darby.30 The question for the
Court had become not whether Congress had impinged on state
sovereignty, but only whether congressional action was within
the scope of federal power. Given the growth and integration of
22. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1,
16 (1950).
23. For a contemporary critical assessment of this abandonment of judi-
cial review of federalism issues, see id. at 17.
24. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
25. Id. at 37 (citation omitted).
26. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
27. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
28. The Court described the Tenth Amendment as
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.
There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was
more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and
state governments as it had been established by the Constitution be-
fore the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears
that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not
granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their
reserved powers.
312 U.S. at 124.
29. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
30. See id. at 127-28 ("That appellee's own contribution to the demand for
wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of
many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.").
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the national economy, very little activity of consequence fell
outside the commerce power. These cases, without quite say-
ing so, ceded to Congress the responsibility for deciding the
scope of its own powers.3 1
More recently, the Supreme Court again has sought an ac-
tive role. This Part examines that quest, from the Court's
short-lived bicentennial year decision in National League of
Cities v. Usery32 through Printz v. United States, 3 decided on
the last day of the Court's 1996 Term. These cases reveal a
Court disconcerted by this century's dramatic expansion of fed-
eral power and by its own seeming inability to do much about
it. The Court is again casting about for some check on national
power and again has failed to draw a meaningful line that has
support in constitutional text or history, or that significantly
promotes federalism values.
A. SOVEREIGNTY LIMITS ON NATIONAL AUTHORITY:
FROM NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES TO GARcIA
In National League of Cities, the Court considered the con-
stitutionality of the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) as applied to employees of state and lo-
cal governments. Long before, in United States v. Darby,34 the
Court had found congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause to regulate the wages and overtime pay of private em-
ployees. More recently, in Maryland v. Wirtz,35 the Court had
upheld the extension of the FLSA to certain public employees,
rejecting as "not tenable" the claim that the Act "may not be
constitutionally applied to state-operated institutions because
[the Commerce Clause] must yield to state sovereignty in the
31. The post-1937 doctrinal revolution reflected much more than a change
in judicial attitudes about federalism. Not only did it occur in the wake of a
political revolution that culminated in Roosevelt's court-packing plan, but it
also reflected a deep philosophical shift: the rejection of laissez faire. The re-
sulting increased deference to economic regulation applied not just to national
regulation but to state and local regulation as well. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605-07 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing paral-
lels between Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause jurisprudence relat-
ing to economic regulation).
32. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Tran-
sit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
33. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
34. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
35. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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performance of government functions. 36 National League of
Cities overruled the eight-year-old decision in Wirtz and held
that Congress could not regulate the wages and hours of em-
ployees engaged in "traditional governmental functions," not
because the relevant state activity did not affect commerce, but
because "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every
state government which may not be impaired by Congress."3 7
The Court's reference to a protected core of state authority
sounded a note that echoed the "dual federalism" of earlier
cases like E.C. Knight and Hammer v. Dagenhart.
The five-member majority, speaking through Justice
Rehnquist, acknowledged Congress's broad authority under the
Commerce Clause and conceded that such authority extended
to regulating the wages and hours of private employees. 38 In
this sense, at least, the case did not represent a return to the
Court's pre-New Deal conception of national authority, under
which Congress could not penetrate the protected enclave of
police powers reserved to the States. The National League of
Cities Court instead argued that "States as States stand on
quite a different footing" from private employers 3 9 and held
that Congress does not have the power under the Commerce
Clause "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure in-
tegral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions."40 The power to determine the wages and hours of public
employees engaged in those functions was "[olne undoubted at-
tribute of state sovereignty."41 By not only increasing the fi-
nancial burden on states but also "displac[ing] state policies
regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of
those governmental services which their citizens require,"42 the
36. Id. at 195.
37. 426 U.S. at 845. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in National
League of Cities was foreshadowed by his earlier dissent in Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). In Fry, the petitioners argued unsuccessfully that
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, which authorized the President to
regulate salaries and wages, was unconstitutional as applied to the states be-
cause it interfered with sovereign state functions. See id. at 547. While the
Court rejected petitioners' claim, Justice Rehnquist contended that there
must be a line between state and national power, and that the line might be
drawn where federal legislation interferes with "traditional state functions."
Id. at 558 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
38. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 840-41, 849.
39. Id. at 854.
40. Id. at 852.
4L Id. at 845.
42. Id. at 847.
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Court argued, the FLSA impermissibly interfered with state
sovereignty.43
National League of Cities was both hailed and condemned
as marking a revolutionary shift in the Court's role in defining
and enforcing federalism." Justice Brennan's dissent, for ex-
ample, described the Court's decision as a "catastrophic judi-
cial body blow at Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause."45 While more than a little hyperbolic, Justice Bren-
nan's opinion captured the widespread sense that National
League of Cities promised to work a dramatic change in the
relationship between the national and state governments.
That promise went unfulfilled, however, in part because the
Court failed to offer any meaningful account of the states' role
in the federal system.
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion mentioned "earlier
decisions of this Court recognizing the essential role of the
States in our federal system of government,"46 quoted the Texas
v. White47 reference to "an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States,"48 and asserted that "dual sovereignty"
assured the states "independent authority" within "their
proper spheres."49 But beyond these platitudes, the opinion not
only failed to describe the states' role but also offered no ac-
count of how or why state interests need protection from the
national government.50 The opinion contained no theory from
43. Justice Blackmun joined the majority opinion in National League of
Cities, providing the crucial fifth vote. In a brief concurrence, however, he de-
scribed himself as "not untroubled" by the case, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring), thus portending his later decision to switch sides on the question
ofjudicial enforcement of federalism.
44- See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Auton-
omy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1988)
(describing National League of Cities as "a revolutionary opinion"); Frank I.
Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1192-93 (1977)
(describing the opinion as "outrageous," and as having "revolutionary poten-
tial"). But ef Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 1713 (describing National League
of Cities as "only the most modest sort of federalism restraint on Congress").
45. 426 U.S. at 880 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 858
(describing the decision as "patent usurpation of the role reserved for the po-
litical process").
46. IL at 844.
47. 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 700(1869).
48. 426 U.S. at 844 (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. at 725).
49. Id at 844.
50. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National Politi-
cal Process-The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW.
858 [Vol. 83:849
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which lower courts (or ultimately the Supreme Court itself)
could give content to the asserted protection for "traditional" or
"integral" or "core" state governmental functions.51 As a result,
while hundreds of litigants raised federalism claims based on
National League of Cities, almost none were successful.5 2 In
the Supreme Court, the case became little more than a sport.
The Court repeatedly rejected federalism claims remarkably
similar to that which it had accepted in National League of Cit-
ies, without any effort to elaborate either the states' role in the
federal system or the judiciary's role in policing the boundary
between state and national authority.
5 3
Finally, in Garcia, the Court put National League of Cities
out of its misery. Garcia initially presented the narrow ques-
tion whether municipal operation of a mass transit system was
a traditional government function under National League of
Cities and therefore exempt from the Fair Labor Standards
Act.54 After argument, however, the Court set the case for re-
U. L. REV. 577, 589 (1985).
51. One interesting feature of National League of Cities is its almost
passing reference to the Tenth Amendment. While the case is ordinarily
treated as centering on the Tenth Amendment, see, e.g., Merritt, supra note
44, at 11, the majority opinion's only reference to the amendment is in the
following passage:
[Olur federal system of government imposes definite limits upon the
authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the States as States
by means of the commerce power. In Fry [v. United States, 421 U.S.
542, 547 (1975)], the Court recognized that an express declaration of
this limitation is found in the Tenth Amendment:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a
"truism," stating merely that "all is retained which has not been
surrendered," it is not without significance. The Amendment ex-
pressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
426 U.S. at 842-43 (citations omitted).
52. See Merritt, supra note 44, at 11-12. For an extended discussion of
lower court treatment of National League of Cities, see La Pierre, supra note
50, at 590-600.
53. See, e.g., Hodelv. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding national regulation of strip mining); FERC v. Mis-
sissippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding national energy policies that forced
state agencies to consider nationally specified approaches to rate-making);
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (upholding application of federal age
discrimination laws to state employees); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978) (stating that National League of Cities
does not limit Congress's power to enforce the Civil War Amendments).
54. Lower courts had split on the question. See Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530 & n.1 (1985).
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argument on the question whether National League of Cities
should be reconsidered55 Justice Blackmun, who nine years
earlier had provided the crucial fifth vote in National League of
Cities, ultimately switched sides and voted to overrule it.56
Writing for the Garcia majority, Justice Blackmun at-
tacked "as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice"
the Court's earlier effort to tie state protection from federal
regulation to judicial identification of "traditional" or "integral"
governmental functions57 This attack targeted two claimed
flaws in the National League of Cities analysis. First, neither
National League of Cities nor later cases offered any principled
basis for identifying traditional governmental functions. After
examining the Court's failed effort to distinguish between gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions in the area of intergov-
ernmental tax immunity, the Garcia majority declared the ab-
sence of "standards that might be employed to distinguish
between protected and unprotected governmental functions.58
Second, National League of Cities erred in concluding that
states need judicial protection from national encroachment.
According to Justice Blackmun:
Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the dele-
gated nature of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means cho-
sen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal sys-
tem lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. It is no
novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government
was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by
Congress. 9
55. See id. at 536.
56. For an account of Justice Blackmun's change of heart, of the decision
to set Garcia over for reargument, and of the decision to overrule National
League of Cities, see Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled Na-
tional League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1623 (1994).
57. 469 U.S. at 546-47.
58. Id. at 543.
59. Id. at 550-51. In particular, Justice Blackmun noted that the Consti-
tution gave states control over voter qualifications and the electoral college
and hence influence over the House of Representatives and the Presidency.
See id. at 551. As for the Senate, the Constitution assures states direct influ-
ence by mandating equal representation. See id. In explaining that the na-
tional political process adequately protects states from the national govern-
ment, Justice Blackmun relied heavily on the arguments made by Professor
Herbert Wechsler in his 1954 article, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Gov-
ernment, see supra note 6. He also cited for support on this point JesseChoper's Judicial Review and the National Political Process, see supra note 7,
and D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Inter-
governmental Immunity and the States As Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.
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These structural components of the Constitution, Justice
Blackmun concluded, not only adequately protect states from
the national government but also reflect all the protection con-
templated by the Framers, who "chose to rely on a federal sys-
tem in which special restraints on federal power over the
States inhered principally in the workings of the National Gov-
ernment itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the ob-
jects of federal authority."6° In short, judicially defined limits
on the authority of the national government to affect state in-
terests were unnecessary because "[tihe political process en-
sures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be
promulgated."61
Beyond despair over discovering manageable standards
and confidence in the political process, the Garcia Court also
invoked federalism principles in support of abandoning judicial
enforcement of federalism principles. By limiting state immu-
nity from national regulation to traditional governmental func-
tions, the Court contended, the National League of Cities ap-
proach imposed added costs on those states that choose
nontraditional or unorthodox approaches to solving the prob-
lems of government.62 "The essence of our federal system7 in-
cludes the freedom of states to "serve as laboratories for social
and economic experiment."63 Judicial protection of only tradi-
tional government functions burdens experiment and is there-
fore "[unlfaithful to the role of federalism in a democratic soci-
ety."64 The ironic consequence of this reasoning, of course, is
less protection for states, as Congress is left free to burden any
sort of state activity, traditional or experimental.
65
Apart from its odd use of Justice Brandeis's laboratory
metaphor, the Garcia majority made no real effort to describe a
role for the states in the American federal system. The Court
perfunctorily acknowledged that "the States occupy a special
L.Q. 779 (1982). See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 n.11.
60. 469 U.S. at 551-52 (citing James Madison and James Wilson).
61. Id at 556.
62. See id. at 546.
63. Id- (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
64. Id.
65. Cf id. at 567-68 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court does not ex-
plain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the Federal Govern-
ment, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their opportunities to
experiment and serve as 'laboratories.').
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position in our constitutional system," 66 but rejected the project
of "identify[ing] certain underlying elements of political sover-
eignty that are deemed essential to the States' 'separate and
independent existence.'"67 Indeed, the Court's opinion suggests
that states will have whatever role Congress chooses to leave
them:
The power of the Federal Government is a "power to be respected" as
well [as state power], and the fact that the States remain sovereign
as to all powers not vested in Congress or denied them by the Consti-
tution offers no guidance about where the frontier between state and
federal power lies. In short, we have no license to employ freestand-
ing conceptions of state sovereignty where measuring congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause.8
Any remaining judicial role would have to be "tailored to com-
pensate for possible failings in the national political process
rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy." 69
Unfortunately, the Court offered no method for identifying
failures in the national political process that might warrantjudicial intervention.0 Instead, without analysis, it simply as-
serted that [i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal
safeguards of the political process have performed as in-
tended."71
Garcia returned us to the post-New Deal world of federal-
ism that had prevailed from 1937 until National League of Cit-
ies in 1976. As it had in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,72 United States v. Darby,73 and Wickard v. Filburn,4 the
Court in Garcia withdrew from the business of enforcing sub-
stantive limits on national power. And as it had in National
66. Id. at 547.
67. Id at 548 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76
(1869)).
68. I& at 550.
69. Id at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,236 (1983)).
70. In the later case of South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), the
Court described Garcia as having "left open the possibility that some extraor-
dinary defects in the national political process might render congressional
regulation of state activities invalid under the Tenth Amendment." Id at 512(emphasis added). As to what those extraordinary defects might be, the Court
simply noted that "South Carolina has not even alleged that it was deprived of
any right to participate in the national political process or that it was singled
out in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless." Id. at 512-13(citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
71. 469 U.S. at 556.
72. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
73. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
74. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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League of Cities, the Court in Garcia offered no meaningful
discussion of the nature of our federal system and thus no
principled basis for its second 180-degree change of direction in
just seventeen years. The Court reaffirmed Garcia three years
later in South Carolina v. Baker.75 Again without addressing
the theoretical underpinnings of federalism, the Court re-
peated its rejection of the "dual sovereignty" concept, holding
that "States must find their protection from congressional
regulation through the national political process, not through
judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity."7 6
Garcia's dissenting Justices, three of whom had been in
the majority in National League of Cities, made two predictions
that bear noting. The first, that the decision in Garcia meant
the end of the States as we know them,77 proved as overblown
as the similar hyperbole employed by Justice Brennan dis-
senting in National League of Cities.78 The second prediction-
that Garcia itself would soon be overruled79-not only was
more striking than the first but also proved more accurate.
While Garcia was reaffirmed in South Carolina v. Baker and
has never been formally rejected, the Court quite quickly got
back into the business of enforcing federalism limits on Con-
gress, first by imposing a strong version of the interpretive
75. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
76. Id- at 512.
77. Justice Powell complained that "the Court's view of federalism ap-
pears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial role that opponents of the
Constitution feared they would occupy," 469 U.S. at 575 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing), and predicted that the Court's decision will "enable 'the National Gov-
ernment [to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty. Id. at 579 (quoting
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); see also
id at 572 (predicting "emasculation of the powers of the States"); id. at 577
(MThe Court's action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright
rejection, of the history of our country...."). Justice O'Connor, with a noted
lack of interbranch comity, warned: "With the abandonment of National
League of Cities, all that stands between the remaining essentials of state
sovereignty and Congress is the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-
restraint." I& at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
78. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
79. Justice Rehnquist, referring to the National League of Cities limit on
congressional power, stated: "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dis-
sent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident,
in time again command the support of a majority of this Court." 469 U.S. at
580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor echoed that view, stating
that "I would not shirk the duty acknowledged by National League of Cities
and its progeny, and I share Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will




policy of clear statement in Gregory v. Ashcroft,o and then by
returning to Tenth Amendment protection for state sovereignty
in New York v. United States81 and Printz v. United States.8 2
As discussed below, these cases taken together come quite close
to overruling Garcia sub silentio.
B. INTERPRETIVE LIMITS ON NATIONAL LAWMAKING:
GREGORY V. ASHCROFT AND THE POLICY OF CLEAR
STATEMENT
In Gregory v. Ashcroft,83 the Court addressed the question
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
prohibited states from establishing a mandatory retirement
age for their judges. The case turned on whether appointedjudges were "employees" protected by the statute, or instead fit
within an exception from coverage for "appointee[s] on the poli-
cymaking level."84 While perhaps not easy, this question could
have been addressed according to ordinary principles of statu-
tory construction.85 Instead, the Court created an extraordi-
narily strong clear statement rule that requires Congress to
state with "absolute" clarity its intent to regulate at least some
state functions. Finding no such clarity, the Court held that
the ADEA's prohibition on mandatory retirement does not ap-
ply to appointed state judges.
The ADEA prohibits an "employer" from discharging a
covered employee86 "because of such individual's age."87 In
80. 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see infra Part H.B.
81. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
82. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
83. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1994).
85. Justice White, for example, agreed with the majority that the ADEA
did not cover appointed state judges, but did so "based on simple statutory
construction," 501 U.S. at 481 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part, and concurring in the judgment), and only after rejecting the majority's
clear statement rule. See id. at 474 (describing the rule as "unsupported by
the decisions upon which the majority relies, contrary to our Tenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and fundamentally unsound"). Justice Blackmun like-
wise relied on ordinary principles of statutory construction but reached the
opposite result, concluding that appointed state judges are not "appointee[s]
on the policymaking level" and therefore are protected by the ADEA. See id.
at 481 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip
P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules As Constitu-
tional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 623-24 (1992) (suggesting that the
case "should have been resolved through well-established canons and conven-
tional statutory interpretive approaches").
86. The ADEA covers "individuals who are at least 40 years of age." 29
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1974, Congress redefined "employer" to include "a State or po-
litical subdivision of a State."88 At the same time, Congress ex-
cluded from the definition of "employee" all elected officials,
their personal staffs and certain advisers, and "appointee[s] at
the policymaking level."89 In Ashcroft, several state judges in
Missouri sued the governor to prevent enforcement of a provi-
sion in the Missouri Constitution that required them to retire
at age seventy,90 on the ground that enforcement would violate
the ADEA. The governor responded that judges fall within the
exception for "appointee[s] at the policymaking level," and that
requiring judges to retire at seventy is therefore consistent
with the ADEA. In light of Garcia, the governor did not argue
that applying the ADEA to state judges would impermissibly
interfere with state sovereignty and thus violate the Tenth
Amendment.91
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Ashcroft began not
with a parsing of the relevant statutory provisions but with an
encomium to the virtues of federalism. Professing to describe
what "every schoolchild learns," she described "a system of
dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment."92 She then cataloged the benefits secured by that sys-
tem, including the ability to tailor the law to local tastes and
conditions, the creation of a market for government services
and hence both competition for citizens and regulatory innova-
U.S.C. § 631(a).
87. Id. § 623(a).
88. Id § 630(b)(2).
89. Id § 630(f). As amended, § 630(f) provides in relevant part:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by any employer
except that the term "employee" shall not include any person elected
to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by
the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be
on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking
level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the con-
stitutional or legal powers of the office.
90. The Missouri Constitution provides that "[all judges other than mu-
nicipal judges shall retire at the age of seventy years." Mo. CONST. art. V, §
26.
91. The parallels between the prohibition on mandatory retirement in the
ADEA and the wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA (considered in Na-
tional League of Cities and Garcia) are obvious. Nonetheless, in EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), which was decided after National League of
Cities and before Garcia, the Court upheld the ADEA as applied to state game
wardens involuntarily retired at age fifty-five under state law. After EEOC v.
Wyoming and Garcia, the claim that application of the ADEA to state employ-
ees violated the Tenth Amendment appeared to be foreclosed.
92. 501 U.S. at 457.
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tion, the increased opportunities for citizen involvement in
government, and the protection against abuses of government
power.93 By referring to the intellectual case for federalism, 94 a
case made by neither National League of Cities nor Garcia,
Justice O'Connor took an important first step in explaining
why the Supreme Court should expend energy protecting
states from the nation. If federalism does what she claims, and
if vital states are essential to the federal system, then Supreme
Court efforts to ensure that the states remain vital make
sense.
The next step for Justice O'Connor was to explain that
Missouri's decision concerning the qualifications of its judges-
that they must retire at age seventy-"is a decision of the most
fundamental sort for a sovereign entity."95 "Congressional in-
terference with this decision," she continued, "would upset the
usual constitutional balance of federal and, state powers."96
The logical conclusion of this argument, of course, would have
been to hold that by interfering with a decision that goes to the
heart of states' sovereignty, the ADEA violated the Constitu-
tion by threatening the continued vitality of states and thus
the benefits of our federal system. Justice O'Connor's analysis,
in other words, suggested the reinstatement of National
League of Cities. Rather than doing so, however, and fulfilling
the prediction of the Garcia dissenters,97 Justice O'Connor and
the Ashcroft majority opted for a special rule of interpretation,
one designed to avoid the constitutional difficulties created by
congressional encroachment. When Congress seeks to "upset
the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers,"
the Court held, its intent to do so must be "'unmistakably clear
93. See id. at 458.
94. Justice O'Connor cited Michael W. McConnell, Federalism Evaluat-
ing the Founders'Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987), and Mer-
ritt, supra note 44, at 3-10. See Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458.
95. 501 U.S. at 460. The claim that setting the retirement age for judges
is fundamental to state sovereignty is hardly self-evident, particularly given
the far greater intrusion on the state judiciary permitted by Testa v. Katt, 330U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that the national government may require state
courts to enforce federal statutes).
96. 501 U.S. at 460.
97. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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in the language of the statute.'"98 In fact, that intent "must be
plain to anyone reading the Act."99
The Court justified this extraordinary rule of construction
on the startling grounds that congressional power under the
Supremacy Clause is "an extraordinary power in a federal sys-
tem," and that it is "a power that we must assume Congress
does not exercise lightly."100 Contrary to these assertions, one
might reasonably conclude that the supremacy of national law
is essential to the American federal system, rather than an ab-
erration, 101 and that at least since the New Deal Congress has
not been terribly hesitant to rely on the Supremacy Clause to
preempt state law.
One matter left unclear by Ashcroft was the relationship
between its new, federalism-driven clear statement rule and
the process-based approach of Garcia. The Ashcroft majority
portrayed the two as complementary: "[I]nasmuch as this
Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the
protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress'
Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that
Congress intended such an exercise."102 By forcing Congress to
confront federalism concerns directly before intruding on state
sovereignty, the Court might have continued, the new clear
statement rule simply enhances the political process upon
which states must rely for protection. One difficulty with this
reading of Ashcroft, however, is that even if the ADEA were
read to apply (or explicitly applied) to appointed state judges,
Garcia strongly suggests that such application would be consti-
tutional. If Congress may set wages and hours of state em-
ployees engaged in core governmental functions, then surely it
may prohibit age discrimination against core state employees.
What, then, is the constitutional question that the clear state-
ment rule permits the Court to avoid? An alternative reading
of Ashcroft is that the Court's opinion significantly undermines
the political process approach of Garcia by calling into question
congressional authority to do what Garcia almost certainly
would have permitted. 103 This understanding of Ashcroft gains
98. 501 U.S. at 460 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 242 (1985)).
99. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
100. Id at 460.
10L See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 85, at 624.
102. 501 U.S. at 464.
103. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 1337-38.
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force in light of the Court's return to protecting state sover-
eignty in New York v. United States'04 and Printz v. United
States.10
C. BACK TO SOvEREIGNTY: AUTONOMY LIMITS ON NATIONAL
AurHOmTy IN NEW YORK AND PRINTZ
Just one year after clearing its throat in Ashcroft, the
Court in New York v. United States firmly announced its re-
turn to the business of protecting states from national en-
croachment. In establishing its new role, both in New York
and then again in Printz, the Court professed to distinguish
Garcia but in fact cut the legs out from under that case's politi-
cal process approach while embracing the "dual federalism" or
state-sovereignty model it had abandoned twice before. With-
out saying so, New York and Printz fulfilled the promise of the
Garcia dissenters by marking a return to the approach of Na-
tional League of Cities.
At issue in New York v. United States were portions of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of
1985.106 Based on a concern "that the Nation would be left with
no disposal sites for low level radioactive waste,"107 the Act es-
tablished three sets of "incentives" designed to ensure that
every state, either alone or in concert with other states, devel-
oped access to adequate disposal facilities. These incentives
took the form of (1) rewarding with cash states that met statu-
tory deadlines;108 (2) authorizing states with disposal facilities
to assess surcharges against, and ultimately exclude, states
that failed to develop disposal plans of their own;109 and (3) re-
quiring states that failed to meet the final deadline for devel-
oping adequate disposal capacity to take title to, and assume
liability for, low-level radioactive waste developed within their
borders.10 The Court upheld the first two sets of incentives,
but struck down the 'take title" provision on the ground that it
"compel[led] the States to enact a federal regulatory program"
and thus impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. 1 '
104. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
105. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2021-2021b (1994).
107. 505 U.S. at 150.
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2).
109. See id § 2021e(e)(2)(A).
110. See id. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
111. 505 U.S. at 188.
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Justice O'Connor again wrote for the majority. After re-
viewing the facts and the relevant statutory provisions, she
quickly established that, despite Garcia, the Court would have
a substantial role in "ascertaining the constitutional line be-
tween federal and state power."" 2 Describing that task as
"perhaps our oldest question of constitutional law,"113 she ex-
plained that historically the Court had used two methods of
drawing the constitutional line:
In some cases the Court has inquired whether an Act of Congress is
authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of
the Constitution. In other cases the Court has sought to determine
whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty
reserved by the Tenth Amendment) 14
These two inquiries, she continued, are:
mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Congress in
the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any res-
ervation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a
power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.ls
The first part of Justice O'Connor's "mirror image" claim-
that the powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution
cannot be trumped by the Tenth Amendment-tracks Darby's
conception of that amendment as "but a truism that all is re-
tained which has not been surrendered."' 16 Justice O'Connor
goes on, however, to reinvest the Tenth Amendment with inde-
pendent constraining force, drawing an analogy to the First
Amendment 17 and echoing the approach of pre-1937 cases like
112. Id. at 155. "At least as far back as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee [14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)], the Court has resolved questions 'of great importance
and delicacy' in determining whether particular sovereign powers have been
granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government or have been retained
by the States." Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 149.
114- Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 156.
116. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), quoted in New York,
505 U.S. at 156.
117. See New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57:
Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the limitations
contained in the Constitution. Thus, for example, under the Com-
merce Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in inter-
state commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that
power by the First Amendment. The Tenth Amendment likewise re-
strains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the
text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which... is essentially a tautol-
ogy. Instead the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the
Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance,
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Hammer v. Dagenhart."8 Once the Tenth Amendment is given
this sort of substantive content, the second part of Justice
O'Connor's "mirror image" claim-that "it makes no differ-
ence"" 9 whether the Court engages in a "checklist" review of
enumerated powers or looks for state sovereignty limits on
power otherwise granted-is simply incorrect. 20 Suppose, for
example, a federal law authorizing warrantless searches of de-
fense contractors. Asking whether the law is within Congress's
enumerated powers would be quite different from asking
whether the law is consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
and the two questions almost certainly would yield different
answers. Indeed, in both National League of Cities and New
York itself, the Court effectively acknowledged the difference
between the two inquiries, holding that despite Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the wages
and hours of private employees (in National League of Cities)
and the disposal of radioactive waste (in New York), constitu-
tional protection of state sovereignty nonetheless prohibited
the regulation in question.
For present purposes, the more important aspect of New
York's "mirror image" analysis is its premise that whichever
question is asked-does the law fit within an enumerated
power or does it violate state sovereignty-the Court, and not
Congress, will provide the authoritative answer. This premise
is irreconcilably at odds with Garcia's conclusion that states
must look to the political process, and not the courts, for pro-
tection from national encroachment. The New York majority
made no attempt to argue that the statutory provisions in
question resulted in any way from a failure in the political
process.121
reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us
to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty
is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.
118. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941).
119. 505 U.S. at 159.
120. For other critical assessments, see Martin H. Redish, Doing It with
Mirrors: New York v. United States and Constitutional Limitations on Fed-
eral Power to Require State Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593 (1994).
121. Indeed, as Justice White spelled out in dissent, the statutory scheme
grew out of a political process in which the states not only were involved but
in fact were the prime architects. See New York, 505 U.S. at 189-94 (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). At one point in its opinion, the
Court did argue that commandeering diminishes the accountability of public
officials, see id. at 168-69, but never linked that argument to the political
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Justice O'Connor and the New York majority dealt with
Garcia by declaring it irrelevant. While Garcia had "concerned
the authority of Congress to subject state governments to gen-
erally applicable laws," the Court observed, New York involved
legislation directed specifically at the states.22  New York
therefore "present[ed] no occasion to apply or revisit" Garcia.-3
Unfortunately, the Court made no effort to explain why its dis-
tinction-between generally applicable laws and laws regulat-
ing only states-should make a difference. No recent Tenth
Amendment case, including the supposedly abandoned Na-
tional League of Cities, had rested on such a distinction.
Moreover, as Justice White said in dissent:
An incursion on state sovereignty hardly seems more constitutionally
acceptable if the federal statute that "commands" specific action also
applies to private parties. The alleged diminution in state authority
over its own affairs is not any less because the federal mandate re-
stricts the activities of private parties.12 4
After dispatching Garcia with barely a mention, the Court
announced what Congress may and may not do in terms of
regulating the states. Congress has the authority to "en-
courage" states to regulate in a particular way by either offer-
ing financial incentives under its spending power or threaten-
ing to regulate directly absent state cooperation. 25 Such en-
couragement, as long as it stops "short of outright coercion," 26
leaves "the residents of the State [with] the ultimate decision
as to whether or not the State will comply."2 7 Direct coercion,
in contrast, impermissibly trenches on state sovereignty and is
therefore unconstitutional. "Congress may not simply 'com-
mandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory pro-
gram.'"28 Applying these standards to the statutory scheme
process approach of Garcia.
122. 505 U.S. at 160.
123. Id. at 160.
124. Id. at 201-02 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Court failed to note an available political process justification for the dis-
tinction. In the case of a proposed law of general applicability, state interests
gain a measure of protection from the lobbying efforts of private parties that
may be subject to the same law. States get no such benefit in the case of laws
that do not apply to private parties. For an elaboration of this argument,
made before New York was decided, see La Pierre, supra note 50, at 648-51.
125. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166-68.
126. Id. at 166.
127. Id at 168.
128. Id at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
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before it, the Court held that the first two sets of incentives
amounted to authorized encouragement but that the "take ti-
tle" provisions, by "cross[ing] the line distinguishing encour-
agement from coercion,"'129 violated the Tenth Amendment.
Justice O'Connor understandably made no attempt to jus-
tify the Court's "no-commandeering" rule in terms of the Con-
stitution's text, since the only possible home for such a rule-
the Tenth Amendment-makes no explicit or implicit reference
to the subject.130 Instead, she defended the rule by reference to
recent Tenth Amendment precedent, the framers' intent, and
political accountability. Even brief examination reveals that
none of the three provides much support for the rule. In terms
of precedent, Justice O'Connor relied chiefly on Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n 31 and FERC v. Mis-
sissippi.'32 Hodel's reference to commandeering was a rejection
of a litigant's characterization of the law in question, not an
announcement of a constitutional rule.133 While it did not re-
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
129. Id. at 175.
130. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the Court's view that the Tenth Amend-
ment "restrains the power of Congress ... is not derived from the text of the
Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is essentially a tautol-
ogy." 505 U.S. at 156-57.
131. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
132. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). For an extended examination of the New York
Court's use of Hodel and FERC as precedent, see Richard E. Levy, New York
v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and
Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 493,
502-12 (1993).
133. The Hodel Court's reference to commandeering was part of its effort
to demonstrate that the statute in question-the Surface Mining Act-did not
regulate "States as States" and therefore did not meet the first of the Na-
tional League of Cities requirements. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287. Read in
context, the "commandeering" reference plainly did not establish a constitu-
tional rule against commandeering:
As the District Court itself acknowledged, the steep-slope provisions
of the Surface Mining Act govern only the activities of coal mine op-
erators who are private individuals and businesses. Moreover, the
States are not compelled to enforce [those provisions], to expend any
state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any
manner whatsoever. If a state does not wish to submit a proposed
permanent program that complies with the Act and implementing
regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal
Government. Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act com-
mandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compel-
ling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.
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ject the idea of a no-commandeering rule, Hodel likewise did
not support Justice O'Connor's characterization of such a rule
as an "established... principle[ ]."134
FERC provided even less support for a no-commandeering
rule. In fact, the Court in FERC actually upheld congressional
authority to compel a state regulatory commission to imple-
ment a specific federal policy, and expressly reserved the ques-
tion of the scope of such authority outside the adjudicatory con-
text: "[Ilt plainly is not necessary for the Court in this case to
make a definitive choice between competing views of federal
power to compel state regulatory activity."135 What the Court
in FERC chose not to decide, Justice O'Connor described FERC
as having clearly established. 36 Moreover, both Hodel and
FERC were decided under the since-discredited National
League of Cities framework, before Garcia adopted a political
process approach to state sovereignty claims. 37
Id. at 288.
134. New York, 505 U.S. at 161.
135. FERC, 456 U.S. at 764.
136. Justice O'Connor accomplished this feat with a creative use of quota-
tion that would have made a movie promoter proud. She quoted FERC as
standing for the proposition that "this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a
federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regula-
tions." 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting FERC, 456 U.S. at 761-62). The full sentence
in FERC, the function of which was to disprove the concept that "the States
and the Federal Government in all circumstances must be viewed as coequal
sovereigns," 456 U.S. at 761, read as follows:
While this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command
to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations, there
are instances where the Court has upheld federal statutory struc-
tures that in effect directed state decisionmakers to take or to refrain
from taking certain actions.
456 U.S. at 761-62 (citation omitted). In support, the FERC Court then cited
three cases that all cut against a no-commandeering rule: Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), which upheld congressional authority to require
state executives to abide by the wage and salary limitations established by the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970; Washington v. Washington State Commer-
cial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 695 (1979), which acknowl-
edged federal power to enforce a treaty by compelling a state agency to
"prepare" certain rules "even if state law withholds... the power to do so";
and Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), which upheld the authority of the fed-
eral government to require state judiciaries to enforce federal law.
137. Even if FERC supported a no-commandeering rule, the Court's 1988
opinion in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), observed that "[tihe
extent to which the Tenth Amendment claim left open in FERC survives Gar-
cia or poses constitutional limitations independent of those discussed in Gar-
cia is far from clear." Id. at 513.
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Justice O'Connor's historical defense of the no-
commandeering rule was as strained as her reliance on prece-
dent. The historical record, which has been explored thor-
oughly by others, 38 is at best inconclusive. Justice O'Connor
rested her case largely on comments from a host of framers de-
scribing the importance of having a national authority that
could operate directly on the people, rather than through the
states as under the Articles of Confederation.13 9 Typical of the
comments relied on are the following offered by Hamilton in
The Federalist No. 15:
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Con-
federation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE
CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of
whom they consist....
[Wie must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients
which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference be-
tween a league and a government; we must extend the authority of
the Union to the persons of the citizens-the only proper objects of
government.14
Contrary to Justice O'Connor's analysis, these comments had
little to do with protection of state sovereignty. Hamilton's de-
fense of direct regulatory authority for Congress, born out of a
conviction that the national government needed more authority
than it had under the Articles of Confederation, cannot fairly
be read as an effort to eliminate congressional authority over
the states. Justice O'Connor offered no evidence that such
authority, which existed under the Articles of Confederation,
138. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Con-
gress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1001 (1995) (rejecting the claim that originalist or formalist analysis
supports the no-commandeering rule); Levy, supra note 132, at 517 (reviewing
evidence of framers' intent and describing it as "far from conclusive); H. Jef-
ferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633,
681 (1993) ("The autonomy of process principle O'Connor has articulated was
not clearly chosen by the founders; indeed, there is some evidence that the
Constitution's proponents expressly rejected the concept."); Saikrishna Ban-
galore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (arguing
that the framers intended to permit coercion of state executive and judicial
officers, but not state legislatures); Yoo, supra note 2, at 1357-91 (concluding
that the framers intended judicial review of the balance of power between
state and local governments, but not addressing the precise contours of that
review).
139. See New York, 505 U.S. at 163-66.
140. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 108-09 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961), quoted in New York, 505 U.S. at 163.
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was inconsistent with additional authority to regulate private
activity directly.
Moreover, Hamilton and other influential framers clearly
contemplated that states would implement federal law.
141 In
The Federalist Nos. 36 and 45, Hamilton and Madison respec-
tively suggested Congress could use state officers to collect fed-
eral taxes.142 In The Federalist No. 27, Hamilton explained
that the Constitution would authorize Congress to act both di-
rectly on individuals and through state legislatures:
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of
the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will
enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each in
the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to
destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the
sources from which they might proceed; and will give the federal gov-
ernment the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its
authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State .... It
merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confed-
eracy as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction
will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of
which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial in each State will
be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts,
and magistrates, of the respective members will be incorporated into
the operations of the national government as far as its just constitu-
tional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the en-
forcement of its laws.
4 1
In her opinion for the Court in New York, Justice O'Connor
completely ignored these and other similar statements,1"
141. For a thorough discussion of the relevant historical evidence, see
Powell, supra note 138, at 659-64.
142. See THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 220 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The national legislature can make use of the system of
each state within that State. The method of laying and collecting this species
of taxes in each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the
federal government."); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (collection of federal taxes, if levied, "will gener-
ally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the sev-
eral States").
143. THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 176-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); see also 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CON-
VENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 140 (Jonathon
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876) ("The [national] laws can, in general, be executed by
the officers of the states. State courts and state officers will, for the most
part, probably answer the purpose of Congress as well as any other.")
(statement of William McClaine at North Carolina Ratifying Convention).
144. Justice O'Connor had addressed these statements in her separate
opinion in FERC, arguing that they did not support commandeering but in-
stead "seemed to assume that the States would consent to national use of
their officials." 456 U.S. at 796 n.35 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
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which come "remarkably close to a point-by-point refutation of[her] views." 145 While the historical evidence may not demon-
strate conclusively that the framers endorsed compelled state
implementation of national policy, it offers precious little to
support the Court's no-commandeering rule. In short, the
Court's use of the historical record in New York is best under-
stood as a strained attempt to defend a rule that lacked textual
or precedential support.
Justice O'Connor's final defense of the no-commandeering
rule was that "where the Federal Government compels States
to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials
is diminished."146 She explained that where the national gov-
ernment regulates directly,
[it] makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal
officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be
detrimental or unpopular. But where the Federal Government di-
rects the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the
brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised
the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision. 47
Unlike the purely formal state sovereignty arguments made
earlier, this claim is a functional one,1 48 flowing from concern
that commandeering is the product of a flawed political proc-
ess. Played out in terms of Garcia, something the New York
Court did not do, the argument would be that if federal policy-
makers are able to avoid the electoral consequences of their
policy choices by shifting apparent (but not real) responsibility
for those choices to state officials, then the ordinary constraints
of the political process will not operate and states will be in-
adequately protected.
Justice O'Connor's accountability analysis suffers from
several fatal difficulties. First, given the substantial overlap
between state and national authority-Cooley v. Board of War-
senting in part). While the statements do not necessarily preclude JusticeO'Connor's reading, nor do they provide any support for it. SaikrishnaPrakash has argued persuasively that "[w]hen Madison and Hamilton dis-
cussed federal benefits of state commandeering, they contemplated a systemin which the federal government has a 'right' to compel state officers to en-
force federal law." Prakash, supra note 138, at 1999.
145. Powell, supra note 138, at 663.
146. New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
147. Id. at 168-69.
148. For an analysis of the formal and functional components of theCourt's federalism jurisprudence, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism andFunctionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 959 (1997).
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dens149 put to rest the notion of mutually exclusive power-
some blurring of accountability is an inevitable byproduct of
our federal system. To the extent that commandeering actu-
ally causes accountability problems, permissible "encourage-
ment" of state officials to implement federal policy logically
generates similar problems. When federal officials persuade
the states to regulate, through either financial incentives or
preemption threats, then those federal officials "may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision"150
at least to the same extent that they would were they to compel
the states to regulate. Indeed, use of persuasion rather than
coercion might make escaping electoral accountability easier
for federal officials, since the ultimate decision in fact would be
made by the states.15 1 Second, the accountability argument
rests entirely on the unsupported empirical premise that vot-
ers will be unable to determine what level of government is re-
sponsible for a particular program or policy, thus permitting
federal officials to escape deserved blame. This view assumes
not only a startling level of citizen ignorance, 52 but also that
state and local officials are incapable of informing their con-
stituents when "Washington" is really responsible for a par-
ticular policy or outcome. Finally, even if the Court's empirical
assumptions have some basis in reality, they remain a strik-
ingly slender reed on which to rest a constitutional rule that
precludes an entire category of federal legislation.
New York, like National League of Cities, identified a pro-
tected enclave of state sovereignty and declared it off-limits to
national regulation. Also like National League of Cities, New
York failed to link its doctrinal innovation to any practical
benefit secured by the federal structure it purported to protect.
149. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (establishing that much of "interstate
commerce" is subject to regulation by both state and national governments).
150. 505 U.S. at 169.
151. Justice O'Connor's opinion also referred to the accountability of state
officials, see id- at 168 ("Where Congress encourages state regulation rather
than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local elector-
ate's preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people."), but never
explained how federal coercion diminishes the need of state officials to re-
spond to their constituents. Moreover, to the extent that the accountability
argument is an attempt to describe a political process failure within the
meaning of Garcia, the political process at issue is federal, not state. See
Levy, supra note 132, at 529-30.
152. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("[Tihe American people love democracy and the American peo-
ple are not fools.").
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Indeed, Justice O'Connor expressly denied the relevance of any
such link:
The benefits of this federal structure have been extensively cataloged
elsewhere, but they need not concern us here. Our task would be the
same even if one could prove that federalism secured no advantages
to anyone. It consists not of devising our preferred system of gov-
ernment, but of understanding and applying the framework set forth
in the Constitution.'1
But this avowedly formalistic approach'54 belies an obvious be-
lief that federalism does secure advantages, that it is "our pre-
ferred system of government." Later in her opinion, Justice
O'Connor wrote that "State sovereignty is not just an end in it-
self," explaining that "federalism secures to citizens the liber-
ties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.'"155 Her
argument never proceeded from there, however. While she re-
peated that "a healthy balance of power between the States
and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny
and abuse from either front,'1 56 she never explained just how
the no-commandeering rule materially contributes to a healthy
balance of power.157 Given the lack of textual, historical and
precedential support for the rule, the absence of any articu-
lated practical justification raises starkly the question why the
Court is working so hard to limit national power.
The Court's June 1997 decision in Printz v. United
States,158 while making clear the breadth of New York's no-
commandeering rule, did little to shore up the rule's intellec-
tual foundation. The Court's five-member majority "categor-
ically" concluded that "[t]he Federal Government may not com-
pel the states to enact or administer a federal regulatory pro-
gram."'159 Relying on precisely the arguments made in New
York, the Court offered no new justification for the no-
commandeering rule other than the precedential value of New
York itself.
153. 505 U.S. at 157 (citations omitted).
154. See id. at 187 (admitting that "[tihe result may appear formalistic").
155. Id. at 181 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
156. Id. at 181-82 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991)).
157. For an analysis of the relationship between the no-commandeering
rule and the practical benefits of federalism, see infra Part I.B.I.a.
158. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
159. Id. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
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At issue in Printz was the constitutionality of that portion
of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act 16 that required
local law enforcement officials to perform criminal records
checks on prospective handgun purchasers. The Act directed
the Attorney General to establish a national system for per-
forming instant background checks by November 30, 1998.161
In the interim, the Act required the chief law enforcement offi-
cer in the area (CLEO), using information provided to the
handgun dealer by the prospective purchaser, to "make a rea-
sonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether re-
ceipt or possession would be in violation of the law."162 No
background check would be necessary, and the handgun dealer
could make the sale immediately, if state law provided for an
instant background check' 63 or if the purchaser possessed a
state handgun permit issued following a background check. 164
In addition, the Act provided that CLEOs need not perform
background checks if local conditions made them "imprac-
ticable."165 Two CLEOs, Jay Printz of Ravalli County, Mon-
tana, and Richard Mack of Graham County, Arizona, filed
separate declaratory judgment actions claiming that by press-
ing them into federal service, the Brady Act's interim provi-
sions unconstitutionally interfered with state sovereignty. In
each case, the federal district court held that the compelled
background check violated the Tenth Amendment.166 In a con-
160. Pub. L. No. 103-159, §§ 101-106, 107 Stat. 1536-44 (1993) (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925A (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 3759 (1994)).
16L See 18 U.S.C. § 922 note (creating National Instant Criminal Back-
ground Check System).
162. I& § 922(s)(2). The Act defined "reasonable effort" to include
"research in whatever State and local recordkeeping systems are available
and in a national system designated by the Attorney General." Id. The Act
provided that if the prospective purchaser passed the background checkrthe
CLEO would have to destroy all records relating to his or her research, in-
cluding the information provided by the handgun dealer. See id. §
922(s)(6)(B)(i). If the prospective purchaser failed the background check, the
Act did not require the CLEO to take any particular action (such as prevent-
ing the sale) other than to provide the would-be purchaser with a written ex-
planation upon request. See id. § 922(s)(6)(C).
163. See id. § 922(s)(1)(D).
164. See id. § 922(s)(1)(C).
165. Id. § 922(s)(1)(F).
166. See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1383-84 (D. Ariz. 1994),
rev'd in part, 66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1519
(D. Mont. 1994), rev'd in part sub nom. Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025
(9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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solidated appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed both decisions,
concluding that unlike the statutory scheme in New York, the
Brady Act's background check requirement did not direct
states or their subdivisions "to engage in the central sovereign
processes of enacting legislation or regulations," and therefore
was consistent with the Constitution.167
The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, first conceded that the language of the Constitu-
tion, including the Tenth Amendment, does not address the
commandeering issue. "[T]here is no constitutional text speak-
ing to this precise question."'168 As a result, he said, "the an-
swer to the CLEOs' challenge must be sought in historical un-
derstanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution,
and in the jurisprudence of this Court."169 In the end, after
somewhat half-hearted (though extended) discussions of his-
tory and structure, the Court's opinion relied on New York and
little more.
In terms of history, Justice Scalia's analysis consisted in
large part of attacking the government's historical claims,
rather than making an affirmative case for the no-
commandeering rule. The government pointed to statutes en-
acted by the First Congress as evidence that federal use of
state government machinery was consistent with the contem-
porary understanding of the Constitution.170 Justice Scalia re-
sponded that "[t]hese early laws establish, at most, that the
Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of
an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescrip-
tions." 71 The government also relied on those portions of The
Federalist, discussed above, 72 anticipating federal use of state
officials to implement federal policy.173 Justice Scalia's notably
qualified answer was that "none of these statements necessar-
ily implies.., that Congress could impose these responsibili-
167. Mack, 66 F.3d at 1031.
168. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
169. Id. In contrast to Printz, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in
New York relied heavily on the Tenth Amendment itself. While Justice
O'Connor first described the amendment as nothing more than a "mirror im-
age" of Congress's enumerated powers, she then went on to invest the
amendment with independent constraining force. See supra notes 115-20 and
accompanying text.
170. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 905-07.
171. Id. at 907.
172. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
173. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 910.
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ties without the consent of the States. They appear to rest on
the natural assumption that the States would consent to al-
lowing their officials to assist the Federal Government."17 4 Ul-
timately, Justice Scalia's treatment of the historical record re-
duces to an effort to make that record a non-factor: 'The
constitutional practice we have examined above tends to negate
the existence of the congressional power asserted here, but it is
not conclusive."175
Turning to the Constitution's structure, Justice Scalia
seemed somewhat more certain of his conclusions. He began
with the "incontestible" assertion that "the Constitution estab-
lished a system of 'dual sovereignty" under which the states
"retained 'a residuary and inviolable sovereignty."'' 76 Tracking
Justice O'Connor's discussion of the perceived flaws in the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, Justice Scalia argued that when the
Constitution granted the national government authority to act
directly on the people, it removed the national government's
authority to use the states as instruments of federal govern-
ance. 177 He offered no new evidence in support of this asser-
tion, and relied entirely on the precedential authority of New
York to respond to the obvious point that the Constitution
augmented rather than diminished the preexisting powers un-
der the Articles.178
Justice Scalia made two additional structural arguments.
First, he repeated the observation made in Gregory and New
York that federalism protects liberty by dividing power be-
tween the states and the national government. 7 9 But again
like those earlier cases, he made no effort to link the particular
174. Id. at 910-11 (first and final emphasis added) (citing FERC v. Missis-
sippi, 456 U.S. 742, 796 n.35 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part)). Of particular note is Justice Scalia's extraordinarily
strained parsing of The Federalist No. 27. See id. at 911. As Justice Souter
ably explained in dissent, the "natural reading" of the relevant passage in No.
27 is that the national government will have the authority to incorporate state
officials, who have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the
United States, into the service of the national government. See id. at 971
(Souter, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 918 (emphasis added). That Printz effectively abandoned his-
torical argument as support for the no-commandeering rule further reveals
the weakness of the historical claims made for the rule in New York.
176. Id. at 918-19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madi-
son) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
177. See id. at 919-20.
178. See id. at 920 n.10.
179. See id. at 920-21.
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rule laid down to the protection of liberty. Second, he argued
that commandeering would "have an effect upon" the separa-
tion of powers by allowing Congress to bypass the President
and use the States to execute federal law.o80 Whether or not
Justice Scalia offered this unitary-executive argument'8' as an
independent ground for invalidating the background check
provisions of the Brady Act, the argument proves too much.
Whether Congress impermissibly coerces or permissibly en-
courages states to implement federal law, the President's con-
trol over execution of that law is equally diminished.
None of the structural arguments for the no-commandeering
rule offered in Printz is compelling. While the Constitutions
preservation of some measure of state independence may be
"incontestible," the significance of that observation for the judi-
cial enforcement of federalism is quite contestable. To say that
states have "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty"8 2 is to say
almost nothing at all about the nature or extent of that sover-
eignty. 8 3 Indeed, when Madison used the phrase he was refer-
ring only to those aspects of government outside the national
government's enumerated powers. 84 Given Printz's implicit
concession that the regulation of handgun sales is within Con-
gress's power, 85 the Brady Act does not touch Madison's "in-
violable sovereignty."
Justice Scalia seemed to recognize the weakness of his his-
torical and structural arguments by describing the result in
Printz as resting "most conclusively" on precedent. 86 Here, at
180. Id. at 922.
181. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
182. 521 U.S. at 919 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
183. See id. at 955 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The fact that the Framers in-
tended to preserve the sovereignty of the several States simply does not speak
to the question whether individual state employees may be required to per-
form federal obligations ..... ).
184. In context, Madison's reference to inviolable sovereignty was as fol-
lows: "In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a na-
tional one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only,
and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over
all other objects." THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
185. Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 937 (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that
the commerce power "does not extend to the regulation of wholly intrastate,
point-of-sale transactions").
186. See id. at 925.
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last, the Court found firmer ground, as New York's statement
of the no-commandeering rule-- [the Federal Government
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program"'87-comfortably covered the Brady Act's
compelled background checks.188 The government sought to
avoid New York on the ground that the Brady Act required
only state implementation as opposed to lawmaking, and
therefore did not violate state sovereignty. Justice Scalia rea-
sonably rejected this proposed distinction because the line be-
tween policymaking and "mere" implementation is impossible
to draw, 89 because mandated implementation of federal law is
perhaps more intrusive on state sovereignty than a scheme
that allows for some state discretion,190 and because the ac-
countability concerns expressed in New York are present
whether or not federal compulsion permits state discretion. 191
Finally, the Court chose to ignore the inconvenient politi-
cal process approach of Garcia. As Justice Stevens said in dis-
sent: "'e majority points to nothing suggesting that the po-
litical safeguards of federalism identified in Garcia need be
supplemented by a rule, grounded in neither constitutional
history nor text, flatly prohibiting the National Government
from enlisting state and local officials in the implementation of
federal law."192 The majority opinion did not respond to this
claim but instead merely observed, just as the Court had in
New York, that Garcia involved a generally applicable statute
while the Brady Act was aimed only at state and local offi-
cials.193 And again just like New York, the Court offered no
reason to believe that the distinction it described should make
a difference.
187. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (emphasis
added), quoted in Printz, 521 U.S. at 926.
188. Of course, the reference to administering federal programs was ar-
guably a throw-away in New York, the heart of which concerned national in-
trusion on state legislative functions.
189. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 927.
190. See id. at 928 ("Preservation of the States as independent and
autonomous political entities is arguably less undermined by requiring them
to make policy in certain fields than... by 'reduc[ing] [them] to puppets of a
ventriloquist Congress.') (quoting Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir.
1975)).
19L See id. at 929-30.
192. Id. at 957 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 931.
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The Printz opinion concluded with an effort to leave no
doubt about its breadth:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to en-
act or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that
Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
State's officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions,
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not
whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of
the burdens or benefits is necessary;, such commands are fundamen-
tally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sover-
eignty.1 94
Left unexpressed in this concluding passage, but made quite
plain by both New York and Printz, is the Court's conviction
that it, not Congress, has primary responsibility for both de-
fining and protecting that system of dual sovereignty. The no-
tion that state interests need no judicial protection because
they are adequately protected in the national political process,
expressed by Professors Wechsler and Choper and made law in
Garcia, looks to be dead and buried. Of course the same was
said of the state-sovereignty or "enclave" approach of National
League of Cities, a version of which has reemerged in New York
and Printz.
While the no-commandeering rule undercuts Garcia, even
the broadly stated version in Printz stops short of fully rein-
stating National League of Cities. By their terms, New York
and Printz would permit federal regulation of the wages and
hours of state employees, as long as that regulation applies to
private employers as well. In other words, those cases protect
a narrower state enclave than the "core governmental func-
tions" of National League of Cities. The no-commandeering
rule may limit the range of means available to Congress, but it
says little about the legitimacy of congressional ends. Only a
Supreme Court effort to limit the reach of the Commerce
Clause generally, which neither New York nor Printz under-
took, could alter the post-New Deal reality that in an inte-
grated, national economy, Congress has the authority to ad-
dress just about any subject it wants, including intrastate
disposal of waste and intrastate handgun sales.
194. Id. at 935.
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D. COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITS ON NATIoNAL AUTHORITY:
UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ
In United States v. Lopez, 195 the Court ended a sixty-year
run of upholding federal statutes against claims that they ex-
ceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.1 96
Lopez addressed the constitutionality of the Gun Free School
Zones Act of 1990,197 which made possession of a firearm within
one thousand feet of a school a federal crime.198 The Court, in a
five to four decision, held that the Act was beyond Congress's
authority to regulate commerce because it "neither regulates a
commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the pos-
session be connected in any way to interstate commerce." 199 By
ruling that Congress had exceeded its commerce power, Lopez
opened up the possibility of a limit on national power much
more significant than the no-commandeering rule of New York
and Printz. In addition, Lopez underscored the demise of Gar-
cia by treating the extent of congressional authority as a ques-
tion for the courts rather than the political process.
After a largely unelaborated reference to "first princi-
ples,"200 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion traced the
history of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence to es-
tablish that there were, and are, "outer limits" on Congress's
vast commerce power.201 The opinion, like those in Ashcroft,
195. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
196. See Fried, supra note 3, at 15 (identifying Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936), as the last case striking down a federal statute as beyond
Commerce Clause authority prior to Lopez).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (1994).
198. The Act made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone." Id. § 922(q)(1)(A). The term "school zone"
is defined elsewhere as "in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private
school" or "within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, paro-
chial or private school." Id § 921(a)(25).
199. 514 U.S. at 551.
200. The opinion offered as first principles the unchallengeable and nonde-
terminative observations that the national government is one of limited, enu-
merated powers, see id. at 552 ("As James Madison wrote: '[tihe powers dele-
gated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite.'") (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)), and that the "constitutionally mandated division
of authority" between the national and state governments "'Was adopted by
the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties," id. at 552
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
201. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (despite broad definition of the commerce
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New York, and Printz, left no doubt that the Court once again
had assumed responsibility for locating and policing those
outer limits. So complete is the evisceration of Garcia that the
majority never discussed the case,202 and no dissenter sug-
gested that the Court should leave protection of state interests
to the political process. In fact, in an opinion joined by all four
dissenters, Justice Breyer "recognize[d] that we must judge
this matter independently."203 The dispute in Lopez was over
how far Congress can go, not over who gets to decide.
In his effort to define the outer limits of congressional
authority, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not openly question any
"modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional
power under the Commerce Clause, 204 and indeed expressly
reaffirmed the Court's rational basis approach to reviewing ex-
ercises of such power. 205 Instead, he read into cases like
Wickard v. Filburn,206 Katzenbach v. McClung,207 and Perez v.
United States208 a distinction between "commercial" and
"noncommercial" activities, suggesting that Congress lacked (or
possessed diminished) authority to regulate the latter.209 Be-
power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), that case "acknowl-
edged that limitations on the commerce power are inherent in the very lan-
guage of the Commerce Clause"); id. at 556-57 (even modem precedents con-
firm that the commerce power is subject to "outer limits").
202. The only reference to Garcia in the majority opinion was in a citation
to Maryland v. Wirtz noting that that case had been overruled on other
grounds by National League of Cities, which in turn had been overruled by
Garcia. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-58.
203. 514 U.S. at 617 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 556.
205. See id. at 557 ("Since [Jones & Laughlin Steel], the Court has... un-
dertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a
regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.").
206. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal commerce power to regulate
wheat grown for home consumption because of aggregate effect of all such
wheat on interstate commerce).
207. 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding application of federal anti-
discrimination legislation to "local" restaurant because it served food a sub-
stantial portion of which had moved in interstate commerce, and because dis-
crimination discouraged travel).
208. 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that Congress has power under Com-
merce Clause to regulate purely local loansharking because it belongs to a
"class of activities" that affects interstate commerce).
209. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61, 566-67. The Court offered a second ar-
guable doctrinal innovation-that Congress may regulate only activity that
"substantially affect[s]" interstate commerce. Id at 559 (emphasis added).
While several commentators have read the substantial effect test as a mean-
ingful change in course, it is better understood as merely "repackaging a test
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cause possession of a gun in a school zone, unlike growing
wheat, operating a restaurant, or threatening violence to col-
lect a debt, is not commercial behavior, he argued, the com-
merce power does not support its regulation.210
The difficulties with Lopez's commercial/noncommercial
distinction are severalfold. First, while the leading post-New
Deal Commerce Clause cases did involve commercial behavior,
none relied on that fact to uphold the statute in question.211
Indeed, Wickard expressly held that although the consumption
of home grown wheat "may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it ex-
erts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."212
The focus in Perez and McClung was likewise not on the com-
mercial nature of the activity regulated but rather on the effect
of that activity on commerce. Second, the commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction recalls the failed, formulaic
line-drawing of cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart,213 Schechter
Poultry,214 and Carter Coal.215 Chief Justice Rehnquist himself
seemed to acknowledge that his test was not terribly determi-
native, noting that "depending on the level of generality, any
activity can be looked upon as commercial."216 Moreover, more
than fifty years ago the Court wisely abandoned as irrational
and unworkable a Commerce Clause jurisprudence that turned
on "any formula which would give controlling force to nomen-
clature such as 'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose consid-
eration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon in-
that [the Court] has recited in virtually every Commerce Clause case decided
since 1937." Melvyn R. Durchslag, Will the Real Alfonzo Lopez Please Stand
Up: A Reply to Professor Nagel, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 672 (1996).
210. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61.
21L See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce
Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554,
564(1995).
212. 317 U.S. at 125 (emphasis added).
213. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal statute regulating child
labor because the statute regulated "manufacturing" and not "commerce"),
overruled inpart by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
214. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(holding that Congress lacked authority to regulate activities that affect inter-
state commerce only "indirectly").
215. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down statute
prohibiting unfair labor practices in coal industry on ground that it regulated
"mining" and "production," not "commerce").
216. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565.
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terstate commerce."217 Third, at least some activity deemed
"noncommercial" is subject to national regulation. As Professor
Don Regan has observed, "[s]urely Congress can regulate pri-
vate sport-hunting of migratory birds or drunk driving on in-
terstate highways or backyard incinerators if they are found to
emit some airborne toxic chemical that is deposited hundreds
of miles from the site of incineration."218
The Court's application of the commercial/noncommercial
distinction in Lopez was as problematic as the distinction itself.
Given that guns are both articles of commerce and instruments
used to further or impede commercial aims,219 gun possession
ought reasonably to be understood as commercial activity. The
aggregation principle developed in Wickard and Jones was
based in large part on a rejection of the artificial fragmentation
of regulated activity. Once an enterprise is understood as part
of an integrated whole, the distinction between manufacturing
or agriculture and commerce becomes untenable. The Lopez
Court, while professing to adhere to those earlier cases, effec-
tively re-fragmented the activity in question by isolating gun
possession from the commerce of which it is an undoubted part.
Both the government and Justice Breyer in dissent argued
convincingly that post-1937 Commerce Clause precedents, con-
ventionally understood, amply supported national regulation of
guns in school zones.220 Relying on extensive literature re-
porting the unsurprising fact that school violence interferes
with the quality of education,22' and on the undoubted link be-
tween the quality of education and the economy,222 Justice
Breyer reasoned that Congress could have rationally concluded
that gun possession in or near schools has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.22 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
challenge the logic of this analysis but rather rejected it be-
cause it "lacks any real limits." 224 He accurately observed that
it "would be equally applicable, if not more so, to subjects such
217. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120.
218. Regan, supra note 211, at 564.
219. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 563-4 (summarizing government argument); id. at 615-31
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
221. See id. at 619.
222. See id. at 620-22.
223. See id at 623-25.
224. Id. at 565.
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as family law and direct regulation of education."2 25 Of the
government's similar arguments, he said that "if we were to ac-
cept [them], we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an in-
dividual that Congress is without power to regulate."22 6
But it was not just Justice Breyer's or the government's
analysis that lacked real limits, it was the Court's post-New
Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 227 Before Lopez, most
commentators had come to the conclusion that Congress had a
free hand in deciding what counts as "commerce among the
states."228 Discontented with that state of affairs but unwilling
to take on sixty years of precedent, the Court declared that
there are limits because there must be limits, invented its
commercial/noncommercial distinction, and struck down the
statute.
Much like National League of Cities and New York, the
Lopez majority responded to its evident frustration over the
expansion of national power by imposing a limit on that power
without a great deal of support in constitutional text, history,
or precedent. Also like those cases, Lopez made no real effort
to link its doctrinal innovation to any of federalism's pragmatic
values. Justice Rehnquist did quote Ashcroft to the effect that
"a healthy balance of power between the States and the Fed-
eral Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front."22 9 He did not, however, make any explicit
connection between the commercial/noncommercial distinction
and either maintaining a healthy balance of power or reducing
the risk of tyranny and abuse.
Lopez, again like National League of Cities, evoked strong
reaction from commentators, with several describing it as
revolutionary.23 0 Because it limits the commerce power gener-
225. Id.
226. Id. at 564.
227. To be sure, as Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion carefully pointed out,
each of the significant decisions beginning with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), included language suggesting that congres-
sional power is not unlimited and that the Court would intervene in an appro-
priate case. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-58.
228. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 1722.
229. 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991)).
230. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 2, at 752 (describing Lopez as a
"revolutionary and long overdue revival of the doctrine that the federal gov-
ernment is one of limited and enumerated powers"); Linda Greenhouse, Focus
on Federal Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at Al (stating that "it is only a
slight exaggeration to say that... the Court [is] a single vote shy of rein-
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ally, rather than congressional authority to regulate states,
Lopez does have greater revolutionary potential than either
National League of Cities or New York and Printz. But Judge
Louis Pollak was probably right when he observed that "there
is less in Lopez than meets the eye."231 The majority opinion
was quite careful not to upset modern Commerce Clause cases,
and two of its five members suggested that Lopez itself was a
close case.2 3 2 Only Justice Thomas revealed himself as a real
revolutionary by calling for a fundamental reexamination of
post-New Deal Commerce Clause precedent.23 3 In the end,
while the commercial/noncommercial distinction has potential
significance, the Court's reaffirmance of cases like Wickard v.
Filburn and Katzenbach v. McClung suggests that as a practi-
cal matter congressional power is not much diminished. Per-
haps the best description of Lopez's significance is as one in a
series of periodic reminders to Congress that its powers are not
plenary and that the Court is paying attention.23 4
stalling the Articles of Confederation" and that "[iut is hard to overstate the
importance of how close they came to something radically different from the
modem understanding of the Constitution") (quoting Professor Laurence H.
Tribe); Timothy M. Phelps, Judicial Revolution: Recent Cases Reveal Slant
Toward States, NEWSDAY, May 29, 1995, at A13 (discussing Lopez as evidence
of a "revolutionary states-rights movement within the court"); cf Mark Tush-
net, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845, 869-75 (1995) (suggesting that Lopez may be part
of a significant governmental transformation).
231. Louis H. Pollak, Foreword to Symposium: Reflections on United
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533, 553 (1995); see also Robert F. Nagel,
The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 661 (1996) (arguing
that those who see Lopez as harbinger of great change "are looking for the fu-
ture in the wrong place").
232. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568, 583 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
233. See id. at 596-601 (Thomas, J., concurring).
234- Cf. PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CON.
STITUTION 192-94 (1982) (so describing earlier judicial assertions of power to
strike down national legislation in the name of federalism). The Court has
been busy with such federalism reminders in contexts other than the Com-
merce Clause and the Tenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting the scope of Congress's enforcement powers under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks authority under the Indian Commerce
Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
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E. THE CONTINUING ALLURE OF A JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE
FEDERALISM
Why has the Supreme Court again sought a significant
role in protecting states from the exercise of national power?
What is the continuing allure of a judicially enforced federal-
ism? There is rhetoric in some of the Court's recent opinions
suggesting that an unchecked Congress might effectively oblit-
erate the states, either by taking over the states' responsibility
for the day-to-day business of governing or by reducing the
states to mere field offices of the national government.2 5 As
Justice O'Connor put it dissenting in Garcia, "[wlith the aban-
donment of National League of Cities, all that stands between
the remaining essentials of state sovereignty and Congress is
the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint."236 But
of course there is no real reason to fear that Congress will de-
stroy the states, literally or figuratively. 237 Certainly the stat-
utes at issue in National League of Cities, Ashcroft, New York,
Lopez and Printz, examined alone or collectively, present no
such threat. Even after more than sixty years of dramatic
(though perhaps now interrupted) expansion of the national
government, "t]he law that most affects most people in their
daily lives is still overwhelmingly state law."238 The states
235. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (warning that the government's justi-
fication of the Gun Free School Zones Act would justify an unlimited, "general
federal police power," "even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or edu-
cation where States historically have been sovereign"); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (stressing importance of "the preservation of
the States, and the maintenance of their governments') (quoting Texas v.
White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869)); id. at 163 ('[Neither government
may destroy the other") (quoting Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514,
523 (1926)); id. at 188 ("States are not mere political subdivisions of the
United States. State governments are neither regional offices nor administra-
tive agencies of the Federal Government."); cf A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935) (describing the distinction between
"direct" and "indirect" effects on commerce as "a fundamental one, essential to
the maintenance of our constitutional system," because without it "there
would be virtually no limit to the federal power and for all practical purposes
we should have a completely centralized government").
236. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
237. See Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
1295, 1313-14 (1997) (describing as "spurious" the "idea that if Congress had
all the power it needed to govern the nation for the nation's general welfare,
the states would cease to exist as states, and we would have a single consoli-
dated country"); id. at 1295 ("Congress clearly is not going to dismantle the
states.").
238. Kramer, supra note 9, at 1504; see also H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Fed-
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aren't going anywhere. Why, then, is the Court working so
hard to protect them?
Reading between the lines of the Court's recent opinions
suggests that the "re-renewed" interest in a judicial role stemsfrom frustration over the contrast between the framers' vision
of the national government and the late twentieth century re-
ality. Despite the Court's rhetoric, its interest may be not so
much protecting the states as checking the expansion of na-
tional power, whether or not that expansion is at state ex-
pense. As Justice O'Connor observed in New York, "[t]he Fed-
eral Government undertakes activities today that would have
been unimaginable to the Framers.239 The Court has allowed
it to do so in part because "the Supremacy Clause gives the
Federal Government 'a decided advantage in th[e] delicate bal-
ance' the Constitution strikes between state and federalpower,"240 in part because, as Justice O'Connor charitably re-
marked, [the Court's jurisprudence in this area has traveled
an unsteady path,"2 41 and in part because the Civil War
amendments fundamentally altered the federal-state bal-
ance.242 The Court's frustration is understandable, given that
the framers contemplated a limited national government andjudicial review, while today's national government is not terri-
bly limited243 and after two hundred years the Court still has
not developed a method of review that imposes effective limits.
Viewed from the end of the twentieth century, the Court's
failure to effectively limit national power seems almost inevi-
eralism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV.73, 126 (1997) (noting that despite dramatic changes following the Civil War
and the New Deal, [lederal law remains... 'generally interstitial in its na-
ture") (quoting PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERALCOURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 533-34 (3d ed. 1988)).
239. 505 U.S. at 157.
240. Id. at 159 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460 (1991)).
241. Id. at 160.
242. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 81 (1991).
243. While this observation is undoubtedly correct, it should not be over-
stated. Not only do states still do most of the governing in this country, but
the dramatic increase in scope of the national government during this centuryhas tracked a similar increase in the scope of state government. Cf Wein-berg, supra note 237, at 1316 ("[Wlith the passing of the Lochner era and the
reign of Swift v. Tyson, the states obviously had more power than they hadbefore the constitutional revolution of 1937.") (footnotes omitted); RONALD A.CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 4 (3d ed. 1998)("While total federal employment has stabilized at about three million, state
and local employment has climbed from three million in 1945 to eleven million
in 1982.").
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table. The framers' chosen mechanism was to enumerate the
national government's powers, leaving all other governmental
authority to the states. But the enumerated powers granted,
in light of revolutionary changes in the national economy, have
turned out to be broad enough to allow congressional control
over almost any imaginable activity. While it is commonplace
to note the effects of sweeping technological changes on the na-
ture of government, the framers' absolute (and entirely under-
standable) failure to imagine anything like those changes bears
brief emphasis. Writing of the administration of Thomas Jef-
ferson, Stephen Ambrose described as a "critical fact in the
world of 1801" that
nothing moved faster that the speed of a horse. No human being, no
manufactured item, no bushel of wheat, no side of beef (or any beef
on the hoof for that matter), no letter, no information, no idea, order,
or instruction.... Nothing ever had moved any faster, and, as far as
Jefferson's contemporaries were able to tell, nothing ever would.
And except on a racetrack, no horse moved very fast .... The best
highway in the country ran from Boston to New York; it took a light
stagecoach, carrying only passengers, their baggage and the mail,
changing horses at every way station, three full days to make the
175-mile journey. The hundred miles from New York to Philadelphia
took two days.... To move men or mail from the Mississippi River to
the Atlantic Seaboard took six weeks or more; anything heavier than
a letter took two months.
2
"
Perhaps more important, "[pleople took it for granted that
things would always be this way."245 No significant advances
in the transportation of people, goods, or information had been
realized since the time of ancient Greece.246 It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that the framers did not anticipate any funda-
mental changes in interstate commerce during the life of the
Constitution. As Henry Adams wrote of the early nineteenth
century view of commerce and technology, "[elxperience forced
on men's minds the conviction that what had ever been must
ever be."247
The problem of enumerated powers becoming limitless was
foreshadowed as early as Gibbons v. Ogden.248 There the Court
addressed state regulation of steamboats, a mode of transpor-
tation barely imagined when the Constitution was ratified just
244. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE 52 (1996).
245. Id.
246. See id at53.
247. HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE AD-
MINISTRATIONS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 52 (Library of America ed., 1986).
248. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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thirty-five years earlier. Chief Justice Marshall's description
of congressional power in the field of interstate commerce as
"plenary"2 49 thus carried with it implications unanticipated by
the framers. Moreover, Marshall also suggested that the Court
would have little role in cabining national authority.250 In the
175 years since Gibbons, with occasional exceptions, the enu-
merated-powers limit on national authority has not been par-
ticularly limiting.
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez offered the following
specter: If Congress has the power to regulate guns in schools
because they
adversely affect the learning environment, then, a fortiori, it also can
regulate the educational process directly. Congress could determine
that a school's curriculum has a "significant" effect on the extent of
classroom learning. As a result, Congress could mandate a federal
curriculum for local elementary and secondary schools because whatis taught in local schools has a significant "effect on classroom learn-
ing"... and that, in turn, has a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.2"l
Exactly right. Lopez aside, post-1937 Commerce Clause prece-
dents, coupled with the integration of the national economy,
would comfortably support direct congressional regulation of
education.252 Unable to cope with that reality, the Court in
Lopez sought to protect education from national encroachment
by creating a new category of "noncommercial" activity and
placing that activity beyond national control.
The Court's doctrinal innovations in National League of
Cities, Ashcroft, New York, Lopez and Printz might best be un-
derstood as reactions to the Court's perception that the federal-
state balance has gotten out of whack and that Congress can-
not be trusted to put things right. The Court's statement in
Ashcroft that "[tihe Federal Government holds a decided ad-
249. Id at 197.
250. See id. ("The wisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity withthe people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections,
are ... the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its
abuse.").
251. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (citation to JusticeBreyer's dissenting opinion omitted).
252. Of course the existence of authority does not render wise its exercise.There may be many good reasons to oppose significant national control of edu-
cation. Many of those reasons are federalism-related, including the numerous
advantages of local delivery of educational services.
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vantage in this delicate balance [between state and national
power]"253 reads as much like lament as observation. This re-
newed interest in a significant judicial role, as Yogi Berra
might have said, is "djh vu all over again."254 The Court's last
sustained effort to impose serious limits on the national gov-
ernment came in cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart, Schechter
Poultry, and Carter Coal.255 Those cases revealed the very se-
rious risk that an effort to put the brakes on national expan-
sion might deny Congress a power truly needed to address
problems unimagined in 1789. In New York, Justice O'Connor
counseled vigilance against "our own best intentions" lest the
Court succumb to the temptation to uphold national legislation
that is merely "the product of the era's perceived necessity."
256
But the more dangerous "perceived necessity" may be a vigor-
ous judicial limitation of national power in the name of feder-
alism, particularly one supported more by nostalgia than by
constitutional text or history.
III. FOR AND AGAINST A JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE
FEDERALISM
The Supreme Court has not yet found adequate doctrinal
tools to promote federalism values without simultaneously ob-
structing needed national legislation. There is little reason to
believe that the Court's most recent steps down the "unsteady
path" of judicially enforced federalism will be any more effec-
tive than those taken earlier. These steps are both unsup-
ported by constitutional text, structure or history and unre-
lated to the purported virtues of federalism. Even on their own
terms they are unlikely to have much impact on the scope of
the national government or the autonomy of the states. The
no-commandeering rule leaves the national government free to
secure state implementation of national policy through the
time-tested devices of conditional spending and preemption.
253. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
254. PAUL DICKSON, BASEBALL'S GREATEST QUOTATIONS 44 (1991). While
some version of this statement is frequently attributed to Berra, see, e.g.,
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 754 F. Supp. 1576, 1577 (S.D. Ga.
1990), Berra denies having said it. See YOGI BERRA WITH TIM HORTON, YOGI:
IT AIN'T OVER 20 (1997).
255. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
256. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992). One might rea-
sonably think that responding to "the era's perceived necessity" is precisely
what legislatures are supposed to do.
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The clear statement rule, at least for future legislation, simply
requires greater care in draftng. Even Lopez, while it may
contain the seeds of significant change, is unlikely to grow into
more than a minor obstacle to a nearly omni-competent Con-
gress.
What, then, is the appropriate judicial role with respect to
federalism? One possibility, advanced by Professors Wechsler
and Choper and temporarily adopted by the Court in Garcia, is
for the Court to stay out altogether. A second option, sug-
gested by Professor Richard Epstein257 and urged by Justice
Thomas,28 is a radical revision of the Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence such that the national government would
be returned to its pre-New Deal size and scope. A third option,
advanced recently, is fashioning doctrine through which theCourt could enforce federalism's insights about the most effec-
tive allocation of decisionmaking responsibility.259 This Part
examines these options, as well as the Court's current doctrine,
in light of both the framers' conception of the judicial role and apragmatic assessment of each option's likely consequences.
A. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE JUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS OF
FEDERALISM
In his opinion for the Court in Garcia, Justice Blackmun
argued against the judicial safeguarding of federalism on the
ground that the "principal means chosen by the Framers to en-
sure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the
structure of the Federal Government itself."260 Citing Wechsler,
Choper and Bruce La Pierre,261 he briefly described the institu-
257. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73
VA. L. REV. 1387, 1454-55 (1987).
258. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
259. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v.Lopez, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 793, 823 (1996) (arguing for a reconstruction of Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence that would "take[ ] into account the positive value
of state and local government, the best uses of federal power, and the ideal
allocation of cases between the state and federal courts"); Regan, supra note211, at 555-59 (suggesting that exercise of federal authority ought to be up-held only upon demonstration of genuine national interest or state incompe-
tence).
260. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
261. See id. at 551 n.11 (citing CHOPER, supra note 7; Wechsler, supra note
6; La Pierre, supra note 59).
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tional arrangements "designed in large part to protect the
States from overreaching by Congress":
262
The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of the
Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.
The States were vested with indirect influence over the House of
Representatives and the Presidency by their control of electoral
qualifications and their role in Presidential elections. They were
given more direct influence in the Senate, where each State received
equal representation and each Senator was to be selected by the leg-
islature of his State. The significance attached to the States' equal
representation in the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any
constitutional amendment divesting a State of equal representation
without the State's consent.20
That these arrangements today provide scant protection for
state interests is largely beyond dispute.26 4 Moreover, contrary
to the suggestions of both Garcia and Professor Wechsler, there
is little support for the proposition that the framers intended
the extent of national power to be effectively nonjusticiable.
Justice Blackmun described his functional claim that judi-
cial review was unnecessary to protect state interests as also
"evident in the view of the Framers."2 65 Professor Wechsler
likewise referenced the framers' intent, contending that [the
prime function envisaged for judicial review-in relation to
federalism-was the maintenance of national supremacy
against nullification or usurpation by the individual states,"
not the protection of states from national usurpation.266 But
while the framers undoubtedly believed that state interests
would find voice in the national political process, and indeed
that states would rely on self-help should that process fail,267
262. 469 U.S. at 550-51.
263. Id at 551 (citations to Constitution omitted).
264. See infra Part I.B.2.
265. 469 U.S. at 551.
266. Wechsler, supra note 6, at 559. Professor Choper, who unlike
Wechsler openly advocated the nonjusticiability of federalism issues, did not
seek support for his position in evidence of the framers' intent. He instead
argued that such evidence was contradictory and unhelpful. See CHOPER, su-
pra note 7, at 242.
267. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961):
[Tihe State legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but sus-
picious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against en-
croachments from the federal government, will constantly have their
attention awake to the conduct of national rulers, and will be ready
enough, if anything improper appears, to sound the alarm to the peo-




they also viewed judicial review as an important tool for pro-
tecting the states from the nation. Other commentators, most
notably Professor John Yoo, have marshaled the relevant his-
torical materials and demonstrated that the framers under-
stood the Constitution to permit judicial review of the scope of
congressional power.268 For present purposes, it is enough to
note that Hamilton's famous discussion of judicial review in
The Federalist No. 78 was a response to the anti-federalist
charge that the Constitution left Congress as the only judge of
its own power.269 Indeed, the critical paragraph in No. 78 be-
gins by rejecting this very claim:
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitu-
tional judges of their own powers and that the construction they put
upon them is conclusive upon the other departments it may be an-
swered that this cannot be the natural presumption where it is not to
be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution.o
So when Hamilton described "ascertain[ing the Constitution's]
meaning" as "the proper and peculiar province of the courts,"271
he was referring specifically to judicial review in cases chal-
lenging the scope of congressional authority.27 2 Even if the
Larry Kramer describes this argument as control through "outside agitation,"
Kramer, supra note 9, at 1515, and fairly characterizes the framers' belief
that it would effectively thwart federal ambition as hopelessly naive, see id. at
1515-18.
268. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 1357-91.
269. See Brutus V, N.Y.J., Dec. 13, 1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THECONSTrrUTION 500 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) ("It is obvious, that the legis-lature alone must judge what laws are proper and necessary for the pur-pose."); Brutus V!, N.Y.J., Dec. 27, 1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THECONSTITUTION, supra, at 618 ("It will then be a matter of [public] opinion,
what tends to the general welfare; and the Congress will be the only judges in
the matter.").
270. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961).
27i Id.
272. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 1385-87. James Wilson, in his speech before
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, made one of the most direct state-
ments demonstrating that judicial review of federalism issues was part of the
original constitutional design. Wilson described judicial review, not the na-
tional political process, as the ultimate protection against national over-
reaching.
[Uinder this constitution, the legislature may be restrained, and kept
within its prescribed bounds, by the interposition of the judicial de-
partment .... I had occasion, on a former day, to state that the power
of the constitution was paramount to the power of the legislature,
acting under that constitution. For it is possible that the legislature,
when acting in that capacity, may transgress the bounds assigned to
it, and an act may pass, in the usual mode, notwithstanding that
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framers put great stock in nonjudicial mechanisms for pro-
tecting state interests, they plainly did not view those mecha-
nisms as exclusive. Asking whether Congress has a rational
basis for legislating under the Commerce Clause, as the Court
purported to do in Lopez, is thus consistent with the framers'
vision. Treating federalism claims as nonjusticiable, as the
Court arguably did in Garcia, is not.
While the relevant history shows that the framers in-
tended a judicial role, it reveals little about the contemplated
nature of that role. As discussed above, neither of the Court's
recent doctrinal innovations-the no-commandeering rule and
the commercial/noncommercial distinction-was contemplated
by the framers.2 3 Nor have the proponents of judicial review
been able to support their particular doctrinal preferences with
evidence of the framers' intent. For example, Professor Yoo's
exhaustive review and analysis of the historical materials es-
tablishes only that judicial review was contemplated; it offers
no account of what the framers thought that review would look
like.27 4 That the framers failed to spell out just how courts
might check congressional excesses is not terribly surprising,
given that the Constitution's federal structure was pure ex-
periment. While the framers spilled much ink on the subject of
federalism, and while it is often described as their major con-
tribution to political theory,275 they "really had no idea how a
functioning federalism would work."27 6 Now, more than two
hundred years later, we have a better sense of the ways in
which federalism works but little more sense of the appropriate
judicial role.
transgression; but when it comes to be discussed before the judges-
when they consider its principles, and find it to be incompatible with
the superior power of the constitution, it is their duty to pronounce it
void....
James Wilson, Remarks at Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1, 1787),
reprinted in 1 DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 269, at 822-23; see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("[In controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdic-
tions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide is to be established under the
general government.").
273. See supra Part II.C-D.
274. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 1314 n.10.
275. See, e.g., Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("Federalism was our Nation's own discovery.").
276. Kramer, supra note 9, at 1517; see also GEORGE W. CAREY, THE
FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 96-125 (1989)




B. PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATIONS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
INTELLECTUAL CASE FOR FEDERALISM
American federalism was a pragmatic invention, a com-
promise designed to leave the states with primary responsibil-
ity for governing while granting the national government suffi-
cient power to handle those aspects of government beyond the
states' institutional competence. The contemporary intellec-
tual debate is likewise pragmatic, with federalism's proponents
trumpeting its instrumental values while opponents describe
its pernicious consequences. 2 7 The Supreme Court has never
fully entered this debate, taking instead a formalist approach
to federalism issues. The closest it has come to contributing
was in Gregory v. Ashcroft, which purported to catalog the
"numerous advantages" of the "federalist structure of joint sov-
ereigns":
[11 It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive
to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; [21 it increases oppor-
tunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; [3] it allows
for more innovation and experimentation in government; and [4] it
makes [the] government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry... [5] Perhaps the principal bene-
fit of the federalist system is a check on the abuses of government
power.27
This paean to state government, while a welcome recognition
by the Court of federalism's fundamentally pragmatic charac-
ter, paints just half the picture. The other half, left unsketched
by the Court, includes the recognition that sometimes national
regulation is desirable or even essential,279 a recognition so
fundamental that it led to the replacement of the Articles of
Confederation and the framing of the Constitution.
The benefits claimed for state regulation divide roughly
into two categories, those that relate to normative diversity
among states and those that relate to reserving power for the
states as opposed to the national government. In each cate-
gory, the conditions that foster practical benefits also harbor
the potential for serious harm that can best be remedied
through national intervention.
277. See Moulton, supra note 238, at 105-07 (cataloging claimed virtues of
federalism and critics' responses).
278. 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991) (bracketed numerals added).
279. See Kramer, supra note 9, at 1502 ("There are, after all, two sides tofederalism: not just preserving state authority where appropriate, but also
enabling the federal government to act where national action is desirable.").
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The diversity-related benefits of federalism all flow from
the fact that normative variation is the inevitable product of a
system in which the states retain primary responsibility for
making law.280 The diversity of policies produced by state-level
decisionmakdng, coupled with citizen mobility, permits a far
greater level of citizen satisfaction than could a single, central
government.281 This insight, which was appreciated by the
founding generation 282 and which has been developed by mod-
em public choice and positive political theory,28 3 retains great
280. Federalism's diversity-related benefits (and limits) are further elabo-
rated in Moulton, supra note 238, at 125-42.
281. That federalism enhances individual preference satisfaction is cap-
tured in the following model:
Assume that there are two states, A and B, with equal populations of
100 each. Assume further that eighty percent of the people in State
A wish to permit contingent-fee arrangements in criminal cases,
while only thirty percent of the people in State B wish to permit such
arrangements. If the decision is made by the national government
based on the preference of the majority, 110 people will be pleased,
and ninety will be displeased. But if separate decisions are made by
the majorities in each state, 150 people will be pleased, and just fifty
will be displeased.
Id. at 127. For similar models, see Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of
Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19,22 (1969), and McConnell, supra note 94, at 1494.
Adding the mobility of citizens (and capital) to state-level decisionmaking
furthers the preference-maximizing quality of federalism. In addition to vot-
ing rights, citizens have "exit rights" as a means of expressing their policy
preferences. See ALBERT 0. HmSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RE-
SPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 106-19 (1970);
Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1237 (1994); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Fed-
eralism, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149 (1992). In the model above, for
example, 20 citizens of State A and thirty citizens of State B were dissatisfied
with the policy choices of their respective states. If some of those citizens
were to vote again, this time with their feet, individual preference satisfaction
would be further enhanced.
282. See, e.g., Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 230 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ("[Olne government and gen-
eral legislation alone, never can extend equal benefits to all parts of the
United States: Different laws, customs, and opinions exist in the different
states, which by a uniform system of laws would be unreasonably invaded.");
Essays by the Impartial Examiner, in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, su-
pra, at 180 ("For being different societies, though blended together in legisla-
tion, and having as different interests; no uniform rule for the whole seems to
be practicable.").
283. See, e.g., WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 11-13 (1972);
VINCENT OSTRUM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 126-32 (1991);
Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady
Path". A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1447, 1467-70 (1995); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
tures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956); Tullock, supra note 281, at 21. On the
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force today. Despite the undeniable homogenization of Ameri-
can culture, substantial social science research demonstrates
that states and regions retain distinctive cultures and atti-
tudes, and that government policies have a measurable effect
on migration patterns.284
Federalism's complement to citizen choice is the creation of
a market for government services, which in turn promotes
competition and innovation. Unlike a unitary central govern-
ment, which is relatively unaffected by competition,285 state
governments have an incentive to develop and implement poli-
cies designed to attract mobile taxpayers and capital.286 While
of relatively recent vintage,287 the argument that federalism
promotes interstate competition and innovation is largely un-
assailable.288
distinctions, if any, between public choice theory and positive political theory,
see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword to Symposium: Positive
Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 458-63 (1992).
284. See Moulton, supra note 238, at 129-31 (discussing relevant research);
see also DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN MOSAIC: THE IMPACT OF SPACE,
TIME, AND CULTURE ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1994) (detailing and categorizing
American regional diversity).
285. See McConnell, supra note 94, at 1498 ("A consolidated national gov-
ernment has all the drawbacks of a monopoly: it stifles choice and lacks the
goad of competition."); THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION
AMONG GOVERNMENTS 14-15 (1990) ("[Clompetition among governments, of-
fering different types and levels of public goods at different costs, provides a
rough market solution to the information problems confronting public offi-
cials.").
286. Michael McConnell expresses the point as follows:
If a community can attract additional taxpayers, each citizen's
share of the overhead costs of government is proportionately reduced.
Since people are better able to move among states or communities
than to emigrate from the United States, competition among gov-
ernments for taxpayers will be far stronger at the state and local
level than at the federal level. Since most people are taxpayers, this
means that there is a powerful incentive for decentralized govern-
ments to make things better for most people.
McConnell, supra note 94, at 1498-99.
287. Justice Brandeis described states as experimental laboratories in
1932. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;, and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try."). That the framers did not tout interstate competition as one of the bene-
fits of federalism is hardly surprising, given that such competition stems in
large part from a ready mobility that was unknown and unanticipated at the
end of the 18th century.
288. Edwin Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have argued that this and most of
the other claimed benefits of federalism could be achieved as well through de-
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What the Supreme Court has tended to ignore about the
diversity-related consequences of federalism is that they are
not all good. While decentralized decisionmaking promotes in-
dividual preference satisfaction, it sometimes leads to perni-
cious norms that are unacceptable to the polity as a whole,28 9 or
to a diversity of norms that creates unacceptable costs.2 90
While the effort to attract citizens and capital forces govern-
ments to be responsive to market pressures, sometimes those
same pressures prevent the production of needed public goods,
create externalities that individual states cannot contain, or
promote destructive competition.291 In all those cases, the eco-
nomics and political science of federalism demand a national
solution. As Hamilton said in reference to interstate com-
merce, "[t]he interfering and unneighborly regulations of some
States" must be "restrained by a national control."292
centralization directed by a wise central authority. See Edwin L. Rubin &
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 903 (1994). While their arguments have significant force, the political
independence of state and local officials requires a level of decentralization
that a central authority would be otherwise free to ignore.
Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued that local politicians in a federal sys-
tem are more risk-averse than politicians in a unitary national government,
and that federalism therefore impedes innovation. See Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innova-
tion?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). The difficulty with this claim is that, even
assuming state politicians are more risk-averse than national politicians,
"there will be more innovation in a decentralized system as a whole, because
there are more actors and because individual constituencies will perceive risk
and reward differently." McConnell, supra note 94, at 1498 n.58; see also
DAvID L. SHAPIRo, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85-86 (1995).
289. See SHAPIRO, supra note 288, at 55-56.
290. Richard Briffault put the latter point as follows:
The value of state diversity ... will frequently clash with the value of
national uniformity. This has implications for both the economy and
for our definitions of the rights of American citizens. In a mobile so-
ciety and an increasingly integrated national economy, people, goods,
services, and capital constantly are crossing state borders. Multiple
and divergent state laws drive up the cost of doing business and the
costs consumers pay for goods and services. Indeed, the existence of
multiple law-making bodies may make it difficult for people and
businesses to know what laws they are subject to and whether their
conduct violates a particular state's rule.
Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1320 (1994).
291. See Moulton, supra note 238, at 136-41.
292. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961). Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), provides an
early example of "unneighborly" state regulation.
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Justice O'Connor in Ashcroft described the other category
of federalism's virtues as protecting "our fundamental liber-
ties."293 She explained that like the separation of powers be-
tween the branches of government, "a healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."294 Federal-
ism's track record as liberty enhancer, however, has been
mixed at best. Critics have rightly pointed out that states, left
to their own devices, have been more threat than protection for
individual and group rights.295 Slavery, followed by persistent,
state-sponsored race discrimination, tops a list of federalism's
threats to individual liberty that includes examples in the ar-
eas of free speech and freedom of religion, criminal procedure,
reproductive rights and civil rights.296 National intervention
has been and will continue to be necessary where states make
choices that the national polity deems fundamentally unjust.297
Protecting states from national intervention, in other words, is
an unreliable tool for protecting liberty. If restraining the na-
tional government prevents tyranny, it does so based on the
293. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991) (citations omitted).
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 288, at 52-55; WILLIAM H. RIKER,
FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 142,145 (1964); Gary Jeffrey
Jacobsohn, Contemporary Constitutional Theory, Federalism, and the Protec-
tion of Rights, in FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS 29, 43 (Ellis Katz & G. Alan Tarr
eds., 1996) ("Where rights are involved, local communities have become the
problem, not the solution.").
296. See Moulton, supra note 238, at 135 (providing examples). Any
meaningful discussion of the Constitution's allocation of authority between
states and nation must include reference to the impact of the Reconstruction
Amendments. Conventional wisdom holds that Reconstruction worked
"profound alterations in nation-state relationships." HAROLD M. HYMAN, A
MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CvIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
ON THE CONSTITUTION 467 (1973); see also JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL
UNDER LAW 239 (1965) (Fourteenth Amendment effected "a revolution in fed-
eralism"). Like much conventional wisdom, this observation is largely accu-
rate. By nationalizing civil rights, and giving Congress enforcement power,
the Reconstruction Amendments dramatically expanded the authority, and
the potential role, of the national government. The significance of Recon-
struction for federalism can be overstated, however. One might reasonably
view the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments more as rela-
tively narrow attempts to address particular (though particularly horrible)
problems than as a considered effort to alter fundamentally the relative roles
of states and nation across the range of government responsibility. It does not
do, in other words, to respond to federalism claims by asserting that the Civil
War changed all that.
297. See SHAPIRO, supra note 288, at 55-56.
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principle of limited government, not federalism. 298 If federal-
ism promotes liberty, it does so by promoting citizen choice, not
by setting state against federal power.
Federalism's great contribution to the science of govern-
ment is not the value of a limited national government, but
rather the insight that dividing responsibilities among differ-
ent levels of government permits the nation to reap the bene-
fits of both normative diversity and, where appropriate, na-
tional uniformity. While the framers may not have
comprehended the full scope of this contribution, modern eco-
nomic theory and political science recognize that different lev-
els of government have comparative advantages and disadvan-
tages in the delivery of services.299 For example, state and local
governments are generally better suited than the national gov-
ernment to design, implement and fund "developmental pro-
grams"--those programs that "provide the physical and social
infrastructure necessary to facilitate a country's economic
growth."300 When local, and to a lesser degree state, govern-
ments design and deliver roads, police and fire protection,
sanitation services and educational programs, they are disci-
plined by market forces in a way that the national government
is not. Dissatisfaction with local public services tends to drive
people and business away,301 which in turn can drive public of-
ficials out of office. As noted above, this competitive federalism
both fosters innovation and promotes citizen choice. Because
the barriers to moving out of the country are much greater
than the barriers to local and interstate migration, the na-
tional government gets far less market-based feedback about
its policies, and hence is less likely to be sensitive to the needs
and desires of citizens and capital.
298. See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
299. See generally PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 17-39
(1995) (synthesizing relevant literature and describing relative advantages of
federal, state and local government in the delivery of services).
300. Id- at 17.
301. This point is limited by the undeniable fact that many citizens are not
adequately mobile, informed, or motivated to vote with their feet. See James
M. Buchanan & Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An As-
sessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 25, 27-34 (1972) (discussing
limits of efficiency analysis that assumes all individuals have unlimited mo-
bility). Nevertheless, substantial evidence suggests that government policies
have an impact on migration patterns and that even groups once thought geo-
graphically immobile, such as welfare recipients, are likely to move in re-
sponse to state benefit levels. See PETERSON, supra note 299, at 30.
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Conversely, the mobility that imposes market discipline on
state and local governments renders them relatively ill-suited
to provide meaningful redistributive programs-those that
"reallocate societal resources from the 'haves' to the 'have-
nots." 302 Local or even state-based redistributive programs
create incentives for the wealthy to leave and potential recipi-
ents to arrive, thus lowering the general welfare of the jurisdic-
tion and undermining the redistributive policy itself.303 State
and local officials, faced with the prospect of such costly migra-
tion, are unlikely to undertake substantial redistribution ef-
forts in the first place. One telling illustration of this principle
is the fact that state and local governments rarely impose pro-
gressive income taxes, recognizing that such taxes might drive
out wealthy citizens and hence reduce the tax base.304 So while
the national government is relatively ill-equipped to meet most
of the country's developmental needs, "[wihere redistribution is
the objective.., advocates should and do press for federal pro-
grams, or at least for minimum federal standards. 305
There are, of course, significant exceptions to these general
principles. Some development-related problems, such as those
concerning interstate transportation or the control of environ-
mental pollution, may require regional or national attention.306
And local differences in resources inevitably lead to inequities
in developmental spending that can be addressed only at some
higher level of government.307 Similarly, some states have suf-
302. PETERSON, supra note 299, at 17.
303. See SHAPIRO, supra note 288, at 46; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & JohnFerejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Fed-
eralism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1364 (1994). The Supreme Court, by ruling
that state newcomers must be given equal access to government services,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), substantially reduced the cost of
moving to get access to more generous programs.
304. See PETERSON, supra note 299, at 19-20.
305. McConnell, supra note 94, at 1500 (footnote omitted).
306. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 299, at 25 ("Any program of pollution
control will necessarily impose costs on particular neighborhoods and commu-
nities. If such decisions are left to local government, each will insist that the
problem must be addressed but the solution should be located somewhere
else.").
307. One inevitable consequence of local control of developmental servicesis disparity in the quality and extent of such services. When such disparity
simply reflects the preferences of local citizens, it is a beneficent product of
the federal system. But when such disparity is rather the product of dispari-
ties in fiscal capacity, it is arguably unfair and potentially destructive. So
when wealthier communities "choose" to spend more on education than do
poorer communities, for example, some sort of equalizing intervention by a
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ficient territorial reach that for many citizens the costs of
moving in or out preclude moving just to enjoy the benefits of
(or to escape the costs of) generous redistribution programs.
30 8
Moreover, not all government programs fit neatly into devel-
opmental or redistributive boxes, making wise allocation of re-
sponsibility more difficult and contestable. In short, despite
the existence of general principles that might guide decisions
concerning the allocation of responsibility among levels of gov-
ernment, there remains room for substantial, reasoned disa-
greement about the most effective implementation of any given
program or policy.
For judicially enforced federalism doctrine to be instru-
mentally valuable, it would have to promote decisionmaking
that recognizes federalism's advantages. Given how much we
do not know about those advantages, however, particularly
about the wise distribution of authority among levels of gov-
ernment, court-enforced federalism doctrine should not deter-
mine too many policy choices. Current Supreme Court doctrine
does little to promote federalism's virtues and indeed may
cause them some harm.
1. Current Doctrine and the Virtues of Federalism
As the foregoing discussion suggests, there are many areas
in which state-level norm-setting holds significant advantages
over national norm-setting. If federalism doctrine could be
shaped to protect state decisions from national encroachment
in those areas, while simultaneously permitting national inter-
vention where appropriate, then judicial enforcement of feder-
alism would have real instrumental value.309 Current federal-
ism doctrine, however, makes no such effort, instead seeking to
limit national power without regard to the relative competen-
cies of different levels of government.
a. The No-Commandeering Rule
The Court has defended the no-commandeering rule not on
instrumental grounds but rather by weak reference to constitu-
tional structure and history.310 As it turns out, no federalism-
higher level of government may be warranted.
308. See PETERSON, supra note 299, at 28.
309. That is not to say that federalism doctrine so fashioned would be le-
gitimate, only that unlike current doctrine it would promote federalism's val-
ues.
310. See supra Part H.C.
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based instrumental defense is possible. In terms of the diver-
sity-related virtues of federalism, the rule does no good and
threatens some harm. First, because it is not limited to those
subject areas best suited to state control, the prohibition on
commandeering could be used to prohibit the sort of national
intervention that federalism demands. Second, the rule fails to
prevent, and indeed may encourage, the most intrusive sort of
national intervention-complete preemption-which in turn
leaves no room for state-driven normative variation. In New
York, for example, the Court left the national government free
to preempt state regulation of the disposal of low-level radioac-
tive waste, while invalidating a system that promoted the co-
operative exercise of state-level discretion.311
In terms of preventing tyranny or promoting liberty, the
no-commandeering rule is beneficial only in the same way as
any other legal limit on government authority. The more care-
fully and clearly circumscribed the authority of a government,
the less likely that government is "to overcome the internal
and external factors constraining its power to the point where
its edicts are sufficiently extensive to impair significantly the
enjoyment of individual liberty.312 This link to liberty, how-
ever, comes not from federalism or the promotion of state sov-
ereignty but from the more general concept of limited govern-
ment.313 Indeed, if limits on the federal government are
designed to unleash state governments, then those limits
might threaten rather than promote liberty.
The sole practical benefit claimed for the no-commandeering
rule in Printz and New York is that it promotes state autonomy
311. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992).
312. Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May CongressCommandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
1001, 1075 (1995) (footnote omitted).
313. See Briffault, supra note 290, at 1323:
The argument that federalism is necessary to secure freedom is, per-haps, a confusion of federalism with constitutionalism, that is, gov-
ernment that is subject to fundamental constraints. Federalism may
serve to restrict government tyranny in polities which generally im-pose constitutional constraints-whether of a written or of an unwrit-
ten form-on their governments. But in that case, it is the constitu-
tionalism, not federalism, that is doing the work of protectingfreedom. Nations may be constitutionally federal but politically ty-
rannical, much as nations committed to constitutionalism are morelikely to be free even if they lack a federal structure. The critical
variable is constitutionalism, including the acceptance of limits ongovernment power and protection of the legitimacy of political opposi-
tion, not federalism.
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or "sovereignty."314 At the conclusion of her opinion in New
York, Justice O'Connor observed that "states are not mere po-
litical subdivisions of the United States."315 While the import
of this observation is not clear, she may have been suggesting
that by placing states in a subservient position, national legis-
lation that commands state implementation unacceptably
damages states by denying them the freedom to make their
own policy choices. But because almost any piece of national
legislation limits states' ability to set norms, that fact alone
cannot serve to invalidate national law. Moreover, state im-
plementation of national policy, unlike the obvious (and per-
missible) alternative of direct and preemptive national legisla-
tion, may promote state interests by allowing states to shape
their implementation to accommodate local needs.316 The
commandeering condemned by New York, for example, left
states with considerable discretion concerning central issues
such as siting and the nature of interstate cooperation.317 A
decision by the national government to regulate directly would
arguably threaten greater harm to state interests than did the
invalidated scheme. In short, the no-commandeering rule does
little to promote, and indeed in some cases may undermine,
state autonomy.
b. The Commercial Activity Limit on the Commerce Power
The Lopez Court made little effort to connect its "com-
mercial activity" limit on Congress's commerce power to any
instrumental value of federalism. While it asserted that a
"healthy balance of power" helps protect against both state and
national tyranny,318 it failed to identify any connection between
its doctrinal innovation and either the maintenance of a
"healthy" balance of power or protection against government
tyranny or abuse. That is not to say there is no such connec-
tion. To the extent that the commercial/noncommercial dis-
tinction restricts the activities subject to regulation by the na-
314. See supra Part II.C.
315. 505 U.S. at 188.
316. See Levy, supra note 132, at 524 (noting that "[eixperience with ad-
ministrative agencies (which occupy the same positions as would states if they
implement federal policy) suggests that statutory provisions leave consider-
able discretion to those charged with their implementation").
317. See id. The background check program in Printz, by contrast, left the
CLEOs with discretion only at the level of administrative detail. See Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 934 (1997).
318. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
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tional government, it arguably reduces the areas in which that
government can commit abuse. Here again, however, this is
simply a less-government-is-better argument. The operative
principle is not federalism, which concerns the relative roles of
state and national government, but constitutionalism, which
holds that all levels of government are subject to fundamental
constraints.
The connection between Lopez's commercial activity limit
and federalism's insights about the relative advantages of state
and national regulation is equally tenuous. The circumstances
that warrant national intervention, while ordinarily involving
activity that is in some sense "commercial," will often concern
"noncommercial" matters. In particular, the fact that the na-
tional government is better able than the states to devise redis-
tributive programs is lost in the Lopez treatment of noncom-
mercial activity. If states are ill-equipped to maintain such
programs, and if the Court means to suggest that the national
government is not authorized to create them, then Lopez's doc-
trinal innovation damages rather than promotes federalism
values.
One thing the Lopez Court seemed determined to establish
was that the national government lacks authority to regulate
education directly, presumably because education is not a
"commercial" activity.319 Yet, as others have suggested, a
strong case can be made that education is indeed commercial,
given its obvious link to productivity and hence the strength of
the national economy.320 More important, questions concerning
the allocation of responsibility for education among national,
state, and local governments are far too complex to turn on the
relatively empty nomenclature offered by Lopez. While there
may be reason to be concerned about substantial national in-
volvement in providing education services,321 reducing the is-
sue to a distinction between commercial and noncommercial
activity both trivializes the problem and ignores the national-
empowerment aspects of federalism.
319. See id. at 565 (arguing that the logic of the dissent's argument "wouldbe equally applicable, if not more so, to subjects such as family law and direct
regulation of education"). Justice Rehnquist further criticized the dissent for
suggesting that "schools fall on the commercial side of the line.' Id (quoting
id at 629 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
320. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 211, at 579-81.
32L See Weinberg, supra note 237, at 1332-34 (arguing that a centralized
school curriculum is something to be afraid of).
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c. Ashcroft's Clear Statement Rule
The clear statement rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft322 does not
itself bar Congress from either regulating any particular class
of activities or encroaching on areas of traditional state con-
cern. Instead, it requires Congress to state explicitly its intent
to regulate core state functions. While the rule is extraordi-
nary in several respects, 323 particularly in terms of its potential
impact on statutes enacted before the rule's announcement, it
is linked to federalism's values in an important way. By re-
quiring Congress to acknowledge its intent to legislate in an
area traditionally handled by states, the rule builds into the
political process an opportunity for Congress to do what it
ought to do-consider whether the particular problem at issue
is better addressed by national or state (or local) government.
Of course creating such an opportunity is no guarantee that
Congress will use it wisely, and the rule seems more a sub-
constitutional vehicle to restrict congressional action324 than a
genuine effort to promote sensible allocation decisions. Never-
theless, given that the ideal resolution of the federalism prob-
lem is to have Congress exercise its supreme authority with
due consideration of federalism concerns, Ashcroft's clear
statement rule does have at least limited instrumental value.
2. Political Safeguards Theory and the Virtues of Federalism
Political safeguards theory holds that the states get all the
protection they need from national encroachment through their
participation in the national political process. The remarkable
weaknesses of this claim as a matter of political science have
been well documented by others.325 The states' power to decide
who votes for members of Congress,3 2 6 for example, offers no
meaningful control given that almost anything a state could do
to protect itself with this power would be "either unlawful or
322. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
323. See supra Part H.B.
324. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 85, at 623-25.
325. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 9, at 1503-14; DANIEL J. ELAZAR,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEw FROM THE STATES 185 (3d ed. 1984)
(describing the structural protections discussed in text as "the least effective
way" for states to influence national policy).
326. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating that voters selecting members of
the House of Representatives "shall have the Qualifications requisite for Elec-
tors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature").
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ineffective."327 The electoral college likewise affords little pro-
tection from intrusive national legislation, although it does still
affect the course of presidential campaigns.328 In terms of the
Senate, any protection afforded by the Constitution's original
scheme of direct representation 329 was eliminated with the pas-
sage of the Seventeenth Amendment,330 and the fact that each
state is equally represented simply enhances the relative
power of smaller states. As Professor William Van Alstyne
bluntly stated, "it is difficult to take the political science por-
tion of the whole 'safeguards' argument as other than a good-
hearted joke."331 To put it differently, one suspects that many
who oppose judicial enforcement of federalism, contending that
federalism values are well protected in the national political
process, in fact are convinced that federalism has little rele-
vance in today's economically integrated and culturally ho-
mogenized America. States need no protection, one can almost
hear them thinking, because states warrant no protection.332
Whether or not Garcia and political safeguards theory act as a
cover for closet nationalists, they plainly do little to promote
federalism values. The absence of judicial constraints permits
the national government to act whether doing so promotes or
undermines the virtues of a federal system.
One useful message buried in the political safeguards
model is that federalism operates much more pervasively at
the level of policy than at the level of power. While the framers
contemplated judicial review of federalism issues,333 they also
expected that the nature of intergovernmental relations would
be shaped largely outside the context of litigation.334 Even The
327. Kramer, supra note 9, at 1507 (detailing constitutional and legislativelimits on states' ability to set voter qualifications).
328. See id. at 1508-09.
329. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature
thereof. .. ").
330. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people
thereof .... ).
331. Van Alstyne, supra note 9, at 1724 n.64.
332. For a thorough and powerful discussion of the contemporary irrele-
vance of states, see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 288.
333. See supra Part M.A.
334 See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: TheOriginal Understanding, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER85, 89 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988) (noting thatthe framers left settlement of disputes between states and Congress as much
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Federalist "directs our attention to what may be called the po-
litical rather than the legal side of federalism." 335 So while fed-
eralism issues ought not to be considered nonjusticiable, the
political safeguards model rightly focuses attention on the fact
that most of the hard work of allocating responsibility among
levels of government happens outside the courtroom.
3. Linking Doctrine to the Virtues of Federalism: The Risks of
Intrusive Judicial Review
The striking disjunction between current doctrine and fed-
eralism values makes it hard to advance the intellectual case
for federalism while at the same time defending the Court's re-
cent doctrinal efforts. One option, offered in different forms by
several commentators, 336 would be to "begin a reconstruction of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence that looks deeply into why it
is good for some matters to be governed by a uniform federal
standard [and] why it is good for some things to remain under
the control of the various states."337 This is an attractive sug-
gestion, particularly in light of legislators' tendency, explained
in part by modern public choice theory, to make allocation de-
cisions based on maximizing their chance for reelection rather
than on public-interest-related concerns like the promotion of
federalism values.338 If Congress is unlikely to consider ade-
quately federalism's normative concerns, particularly the bene-
fits of state-level regulation, then perhaps courts should use
those concerns as a basis for restricting national action. Upon
examination, however, this proposed cure suffers from serious
difficulties.
What would federalism doctrine reconstructed to promote
federalism values look like? Professor Althouse has suggested
to informal political process as to decisions by Supreme Court); Samuel H.
Beer, The Modernization of American Federalism, PUBLIUS, Spring 1973, at
49, 51 (federalism influences pattern of intergovernmental relations "[b]oth as
a juristic device and as an element of political culture").
335. Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a National
nor a Federal Constitution, but a Composition of Both," 86 YALE L.J. 1273,
1283 (1977).
336. See, e.g., Althouse, supra note 259; Regan, supra note 211.
337. Althouse, supra note 259, at 817.
338. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CON-
NECTION 5-6, 13-17 (1974); Jonathan Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the
Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 53 (1988);
Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON.
211, 212-14 (1976); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGT. SCI. 3, 3-13 (1971).
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that national legislation should be examined to determine
whether it addresses (1) "a national market or other system or
organization that causes harm at a national level" or (2) harm
caused by "moving from state to state." 39 In both classes of
cases, she contends, national legislation is warranted because
states are less well-suited than the national government to of-
fer solutions.340 In other classes of cases, her federalism doc-
trine apparently would direct courts to strike down national
legislation.341 As an example of permissible national regulation
in the first category, she offers the regulation of wheat produc-
tion at issue in Wickard v. Filburn,342 explaining that even Fil-
burn's local behavior "was a component in a national problem
susceptible only to a national solution.343 Her example of a
harm caused by crossing state lines is the phenomenon of par-
ents moving from state to state to avoid child support obliga-
tions, a problem addressed by the Child Support Recovery Act
of 1992.344 Some such national legislation is legitimate, she ex-
plains, because states acting individually lack the capacity to
enforce obligations on parents who have moved to another
state. "In contrast, the kind of activity involved in Lopez was
not only susceptible to local regulation, states had traditionally
assumed responsibility in this area and were in all likelihood
better suited to handle it."345
Professor Regan urges redefining the commerce power to
uphold national action "where and only where there is specialjustification for it."346 His special justifications look much like
Althouse's, although he provides more in the way of elabora-
tion. The national government may legislate either to promote
"general interests of the Union" or to address problems as "to
which the states are separately incompetent."347 By general in-
terests of the Union he means interests belonging to the nation
339. Althouse, supra note 259, at 817.
340. See id. at 817-22.
341. Professor Althouse cautions that she is offering not "a definitive
structure for Commerce Clause analysis, but... the beginning of an explora-
tion into its meaning." Id. at 817.
342. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
343. Althouse, supra note 259, at 818.
344. See id. at 820.
345. Id. at 818.
346. Regan, supra note 211, at 555.
347. Id. at 570 (quoting NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 298-304, 380 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed.,
1966)).
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as a whole, such as national security and transportation and
communication systems, as opposed to interests that some or
all people or states happen to have in common, such as reduc-
ing violence in schools.348 By matters as to which the states are
separately incompetent, he means problems that cross state
lines in ways that render individual state solutions necessarily
ineffective. Wickard v. Filburn was rightly decided, for exam-
ple, because in the face of a national market for wheat, an in-
dividual state could not effectively boost prices by limiting pro-
duction. 349 Similarly, state-based minimum wage regulation is
problematic because of the mobility of goods and capital.350
Both Althouse and Regan suggest that courts assessing
the validity of national legislation ask some version of the
question, "Is there a good reason to believe that the national
government, as opposed to state governments, ought to be ad-
dressing this problem?" This approach recognizes that feder-
alism's central question is one of institutional choice, of decid-
ing which level of government is best suited to solve particular
problems (or to decide whether something is a problem at all).
However, this approach also raises the fundamental institu-
tional-capacity question posed by the judicial enforcement of
federalism-is the judiciary the institution best suited to make
federalism's allocation decisions?351
The difficulty with searching judicial review of legislative
decisions allocating government responsibility is that such de-
cisions are often enormously complex and quite contestable, at
both the empirical and the normative levels. For example,
Regan and Althouse observe that some state regulation has
cross-boundary effects that, if serious enough, would warrant
national intervention. Judicial disapproval of national inter-
vention would require reviewing, and second-guessing, two
congressional judgments: first, the empirical determination
that the cross-boundary effects are substantial; and second, the
normative judgment that the value of national action therefore
outweighs the benefits of state action.352 The empirical deter-
348. See id. at 571.
349. See id. at 583-86.
350. See d. at 586-87.
351. Furthermore, the approach proposed by Professors Althouse and
Regan, by demanding special justification for national legislation beyond a
connection to interstate commerce, seems to reverse the usual presumption of
constitutionality for economic legislation that has prevailed since 1937.
352. See Briffault, supra note 290, at 1350.
FEDERALISM 9151999]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mination is one better made by legislators with access to a
wide range of relevant data than by courts limited to the pres-
entations offered by contestants in lawsuits. More important,
the ultimate normative choice between state diversity and na-
tional uniformity is the sort of "open-ended and value-laden as-
sessment of the conflicting political values" 353 that our system
rightly commits to the political process. Federalism theory
recognizes that state-level norm-setting is not always a good
thing. While decentralized decisionmaking promotes citizen
satisfaction and healthy competition, it also raises the cost of
interstate transactions, multiplies externalities, and author-
izes local bias. In other words, for every advantage of state-
level norm-setting there exists a countervailing reason to favor
national regulation, depending on both subtle factual differ-
ences and the relative normative weight given to diversity ver-
sus uniformity. To grant judges the responsibility for undoing
congressional allocation decisions based on federalism values
or an alternative view of the facts is to invite the bald substitu-
tion of judicial preferences for the judgments of elected offi-
cials.354
The current debate over the appropriate allocation of
norm-setting and enforcement authority in environmental
regulation both illustrates the complexity of the allocation de-
cision and suggests the perils of a significant judicial role. In
1977, Richard Stewart applied the now familiar "race to the
bottom" argument for national intervention to the regulation of
pollution:
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state
or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high envi-
ronmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry and
obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting envi-
ronmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to
other areas with lower standards. If each locality reasons in the
same way, all will adopt lower standards of environmental quality
than they would prefer if there were some binding mechanism that
enabled them simultaneously to enact higher standards, thus elimi-
nating the threatened loss of industry or development.31S
For adherents to this view, the only available "binding mecha-
nism" for avoiding such destructive competition and promoting
353. 1d. at 1352.
354. See id. at 1350.
355. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism inMandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE
L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) (footnote omitted).
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rational collective action is the national government.3 6 Re-
cently, however, Stewart's analysis has been challenged on the
ground that the benefits of a decentralized approach to envi-
ronmental regulation may outweigh the benefits of national
uniformity.357 That challenge has itself generated a flurry of
responses, 358 and the policy debate has now advanced to the
point that sophisticated commentators understand that each
environmental issue presents its own unique set of concerns,
some of which may be best addressed locally, some nationally,
and some internationally.359 For courts to define and enforce a
strong preference for regulation at any one level would be to
ignore what the executive and legislative branches are much
better able to consider-the enormous variety and complexity
of environmental problems, and the range of viable responses
to those problems.
Serious institutional choice analysis requires a comparison
of alternatives, not merely a determination that one alterna-
tive has shortcomings.3 60 One response to the claim that the
courts are ill-suited to make federalism's allocation decisions,
therefore, is that Congress, at least on occasion, is worse.361
Public choice theory holds that participants in the political
process act not to further the public interest but only to further
their own interest.362 This theory would seem to predict that
356. See, e.g., PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITs 170-71 (1981) (arguing that
federal environmental standards are necessary for effective control of indus-
try). In theory, states could avoid the destructive race to the bottom by nego-
tiating in their collective interest. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of So-
cial Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 17-19 (1960). "But the complexity of most
problems of interjurisdictional spillover present insurmountable transaction
costs to effective interstate bargaining." Moulton, supra note 238, at 141
n.332 (citing authorities).
357. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
358. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is
There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997);
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Per-
spective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoLY F.
225 (1997); Peter Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental
Law, 14 YALE L. & POLY REV. 67 (1996).
359. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570 (1995).
360. See KOMESAR, supra note 12, at 5-7.
36L See Althouse, supra note 259, at 804.
362. See sources cited supra note 338.
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the national government, and particularly its elected officials,
"will always exercise its power to preempt local law-either to
regulate or to forbear from regulating-in order to obtain for
itself the political support associated with providing laws to in-
terested political coalitions. 363 Even with the gloss that na-
tional legislators will defer to states in that class of cases in
which such deference will maximize political support,364 public
choice theory offers strong evidence that Congress cannot al-
ways be trusted to keep federalism values in mind when allo-
cating decisionnaking responsibility. The expansion of federal
criminal law offers a good example of national legislation that
often looks like little more than a cheap grab for votes. One
suspects, for example, that neither the federal carjacking stat-
ute365 nor the Gun Free School Zones Act was founded on a
considered judgment that federalism values required a na-
tional solution. If the political process does not protect those
values, the argument runs, then a significant role for courts is
warranted after a11.366
The public choice argument for more intrusive judicial re-
view suffers from several serious weaknesses, however, even
beyond the question of its constitutional legitimacy.367 First,
while public choice theory certainly enriches our understand-
ing of the political process, its portrait of that process is at best
incomplete. Critics have argued persuasively that "noneconomic
factors such as altruism and ideology play at least some role in
363. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the
Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Fed-
eralism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 266 (1990).
364. Macey identifies three sets of circumstances in which Congress will
defer to state regulation:
(1) when a particular state has developed a body of regulation that
comprises a valuable capital asset and federal regulation would dissi-
pate the value of that asset; (2) when the political-support-
maximizing outcome varies markedly from area to area due to the
existence of spatial monopolies, variegated local political optima, and
variations in voter preferences across regions; and (3) where Con-
gress can avoid potentially damaging political opposition from spe-
cial-interest groups by putting the responsibility for a particularly
controversial issue on state and local governments.
1d. at 268-69.
365. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (making the taking by violence of a motor
vehicle involved in interstate commerce a federal crime punishable by up to 15
years in prison).
366. See Althouse, supra note 259, at 818.
367. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intru-
sive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 36-44 (1991).
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political participation and decisionmaking,"368 and that consid-
eration of the public interest is not shut out of the political
process.369 Second, even on its own terms public choice theory
predicts that Congress is more likely to defer to state-level
norm-setting in precisely those areas where the value of state
regulation is strongest-maximizing citizen preference through
normative diversity and regulatory innovation.370 Third, the
loci of decisionmaking preferred by advocates of more intrusive
judicial review-federal courts and state legislatures-are
themselves subject to interest-group pressures similar to those
that plague Congress.371 Fourth, and perhaps most important,
the use of public choice theory to condemn Congress's failure to
defer adequately to states depends on a normative judgment
about how much deference is adequate. 372 In other words, the
public choice case for intrusive judicial review is not a process
objection to the nature of political decisionmaking but a nor-
mative objection to particular political outcomes.
The controversial nature of public choice claims about de-
fects in the political process, together with the complete ab-
sence of constitutional guidance as to how to resolve normative
conflicts between state diversity and national uniformity,373
compel the conclusion that such claims do not themselves jus-
tify more searching judicial review, even review closely linked
to the promotion of federalism values. In addition, vigorous
judicial review of federalism issues creates several related
risks that bear on the wisdom of such review.
368. Id. at 43.
369. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Ra-
tionality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12-45
(1991); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 887-901 (1987).
370. See Macey, supra note 363, at 268.
371 See Elhauge, supra note 367, at 67-87 (demonstrating that the litiga-
tion process is subject to forms of interest-group influence that may be as dis-
torting as such influence in the political process). The relative susceptibility
of state and federal governments to interest-group capture is a matter of con-
troversy, or at least uncertainty. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 173 (1985) (asserting that lower transaction
costs of capturing states makes states more susceptible), with RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 504 (A. James Casner et al. eds., 3d ed.
1986) (noting that the relative ease of exit for those harmed by capture makes
states less susceptible).
372. See Elhauge, supra note 367, at 48-66.
373. See Briffault, supra note 290, at 1350.
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The greatest harm threatened by federalism-based limits
on congressional authority is the prospect of denying the na-
tion the power needed to address problems beyond the institu-
tional competence of the states.374 Admittedly, the Court's re-
cent Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment cases do not
themselves seem to pose such a threat. Congress can avoid the
no-commandeering rule easily enough, through either direct
regulation or spending power persuasion. The commercial/
noncommercial distinction of Lopez, if rigorously enforced, may
prove a greater obstacle to congressional action, but most of
what Congress has unique institutional competence to regulate
is likely to be in some sense "commercial." Nevertheless, cases
like Hammer v. Dagenhart, Adkins v. Children's Hospital3 75
and Carter Coal illustrate that a restrictive view of national
authority can, on occasion, deny the institution uniquely com-
petent to address a particular problem the power to act. Re-
cent commentary in the area of environmental regulation, for
example, has employed both Lopez and Printz to argue that the
national government lacks authority to enact certain kinds of
programs. 376 Taking such programs out of play in the policy
analysis would necessarily threaten effective environmental
enforcement.77
3746 Cf Weinberg, supra note 237, at 1341 ("There is a danger, of which
history affords enough examples, that on some wrong theory of federalism the
Supreme Court will deny a needed power to Congress.").
375. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding that District of Columbia law setting
minimum wages for women violated substantive due process), overruled in
part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
376. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green Aspects of Printz
The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6
GEO. MASON L. REV. 573 (1998); David A. Lineham, Note, Endangered Regu-
lation: Why the Commerce Clause May No Longer Be Suitable Habitat for En-
dangered Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 365 (1998);
see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (invalidating
Army Corp of Engineers' wetlands regulation as beyond scope of Clean Water
Act, noting that Congress might lack commerce power to authorize such a
regulation).
377. Not surprisingly, both Lopez and Prints have been used to challenge
the constitutionality of a wide range of federal statutes. One example that
has garnered significant attention is the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18 &
42 U.S.C.). On March 5, 1999, the en banc Fourth Circuit held that the Act's
creation of a private right of action for persons injured by "a crime of violence
motivated by gender," 42 U.S.C. § 13981, exceeded Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, No. 96-1814, 1999 WL 111891(4th Cir. 1999). See generally David M. Fine, Note, The Violence Against
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The environmental example illustrates a second and re-
lated problem-disputes about the extent of national authority
can distract from, and skew, important analysis of relative in-
stitutional competence. Because the absence of power moots a
claim of superior competence, proponents of state-level norm-
setting may be tempted to focus on arguing (or litigating) the
lack of national authority to address a particular problem,
rather than on demonstrating the advantages of leaving the
matter to the states. At a time when the policy discussion con-
cerning institutional choice in environmental regulation is
reaching a sophisticated and nuanced level, fighting over ques-
tions of power is counterproductive.
Meaningful policy debate is also hampered by the frequent
treatment of federalism as nothing more than a limit on na-
tional power. The Court's twentieth century federalism juris-
prudence fits that description, focusing as it has on protecting
state interests by declaring federal laws unconstitutional. 37 8
As discussed above, federalism is as much about the empow-
erment of the national government as it is about the protection
of state government. The Court's relentless focus on federal-
ism as promoting state-level decisionmaking ignores the na-
tional side of the ledger, and encourages devolution of author-
ity without regard to critical questions of institutional
competence. Indeed, the Court's one-way perspective on feder-
alism gives succor to those "strategic federalists" who are in-
terested not in protecting state-level decisionmaking but in
preventing government action at any level. Some who advocate
aggressive judicial enforcement of federalism, ostensibly to
protect state interests, plainly do so in the hope (or belief) that
once the national government is out of the picture the states
will choose to do nothing. The National Rifle Association's
stirring defense of local law enforcement officers in Printz3 9 is
just one of countless examples of strategic federalism that have
included opposition to national abolition of slavery, resistance
to New Deal era federal labor legislation, and challenges to
Women Act of 1994: The Proper Federal Role in Policing Domestic Violence, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 252 (1998) (describing and criticizing the constitutional
challenges).
378. See supra Part I; Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not As Limits, but
As Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219, 1221-25 (1997).
379. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Rifle Association of America
in Support of Petitioners at 8-19, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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civil rights legislation.380 Given the opportunity, the NRA un-
doubtedly would don nationalist garb in order to support a fed-
eral statute barring state restrictions on gun possession.
Genuine advocates of a judicially enforced federalism,
much like the Supreme Court in New York and Lopez, are
searching for some limit on congressional authority because
they know the Constitutions framers did not contemplate an
omni-competent Congress. They rightly argue that Garcia's
argument for nonjusticiability is unsupported either by the
framers' intent or by the illusory claim that states are fully
protected by the structure of the political process. But given
the framers' enumerated-powers approach to limiting congres-
sional competence, and the wholly unanticipated revolution in
transportation, communication, and the American economy as
a whole, the late-twentieth century reality is that outside the
Bill of Rights the Constitution no longer limits congressional
power in a serious way. As a consequence, the appropriate ju-
dicial role may turn out in practice to be not too different from
that advanced by Garcia. Any effort by the Court to invent
new limits usurps congressional authority and, if intended to
have any bite, may prove more harmful than the malady at
which it is aimed.
IV. CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM'S FUTURE
The contemporary search for a judicially enforceable fed-
eralism has been largely a search for ways to limit national
authority. This approach mistakes federalism for a theory of
limited government, when in fact it is a theory of allocating
government responsibility. The critical question is not how do
we protect the states from the nation, but how do we allocate
particular responsibilities to the level of government best
equipped to handle those responsibilities. Given the national
government's power to preempt state law, the dominating in-
terest in "a device to ensure that federal policymakers leave
suitable decisions to the states" 381 may be understandable.
Nevertheless, recent history suggests that placing much reli-
ance on courts to fashion such a device, let alone one that ad-
vances the full range of federalism values, is a serious mistake.
Despite the lack of meaningful judicial contribution, and
contrary to occasional cries of alarm about national usurpation,
380. See Chemerinsky, supra note 378, at 1240.
381. Kramer, supra note 9, at 1511.
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the general allocation of responsibility between the national
and state governments is roughly consistent with the norma-
tive recommendations of federalism theory.382 By and large,
the national government today concentrates on what it is best
suited to handle--"income redistribution through pensions,
welfare, health care, and other programs aimed at the needy,
the sick, the disabled, and the disadvantaged."383 At the same
time, the bulk of economic development programs are appro-
priately in the hands of state and local governments.
384
The picture is not entirely rosy, of course. While the na-
tional government has been reducing its involvement in devel-
opmental programs since the mid-1970s, it arguably should
leave more responsibility for matters like job training, trans-
portation and crime control to the states, which, unlike the na-
tional government, have the benefit of useful market signals to
judge such programs' effectiveness.385 Particularly in the area
of criminal law, recent history has demonstrated that the per-
ceived need to court votes can obliterate considerations of the
public interest. The real dark cloud, however, is on the other
horizon. In August 1996, President Clinton signed new welfare
legislation 386 that was designed in large part to move primary
responsibility for welfare to state governments. The extent to
which the legislation accomplishes that objective is a matter of
some dispute,387 but the economics of federalism direct that
welfare policy be determined at the national level.388 Those
neo-federalists riding the bandwagon of devolution 389 appar-
382. See PETERSON, supra note 299, at 175-95.
383. Id. at 186.
384. See id. at 195.
385. As Richard Briffault points out, national programs better handled at
the state level can pose problems beyond the relative lack of national compe-
tence. "By crowding state agendas with federal programs, and pressuring the
states to commit their personnel, treasure, and authority to federal concerns,
these measures can limit the capacity of the states to pursue their own state-
initiated programs." Briffault, supra note 290, at 1352 (citation omitted).
386. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
387. Compare, e.g., Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has
Done, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 43, 49 (contending that under the
statute states "can now do almost anything they want"), with Candice Hoke,
State Discretion Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality and
a Federalism-Based Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 115
(1998) (arguing that the law constricts state discretion in critical areas by re-
quiring adherence to conservative national goals).
388. See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
389. See generally CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas
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ently have forgotten federalism's insight that the national gov-
ernment is better equipped than the states to handle redistri-
bution. Or what may be more likely, they promote devolution
of redistribution to the states not because states are likely to
do better but rather in the hope of dramatically reducing the
overall level of redistribution. While an optimist might predict
that true commitment of redistribution to the states will prove
unworkable and therefore be short-lived, necessitating a return
to national control, this is surely a situation that bears watch-
ing. Just as surely, however, it is not a situation about which
the courts can or should do much of anything.
What, then, is the appropriate role for judicial review in
federalism's future? While the framers did envision judicial
review of federalism issues, the mechanism of such review was
keeping Congress to its enumerated powers, which, as a result
of technological changes beyond the framers' imagination, have
appropriately expanded to something close to a general police
power. Perhaps the framers also assumed that courts would
act to prevent Congress from effectively eliminating states as
the constitutive units of our federal structure.390 But given
that states are, and seem destined to remain, a salient feature
of American political life, it is unlikely that courts will have to
perform this last-gasp defense function. As to choosing be-
tween state- and national-level lawmaking, the framers did not
claim to have worked out the political science and economics of
federalism, and did not contemplate that later courts would do
that work for them. As a consequence, the Constitution grants
no license to courts to second-guess congressional resolution of
questions of institutional choice. Moreover, as a practical mat-
ter courts are simply ill-suited for the enormously complex(and contestable) task of determining the optimal allocation of
power in a federal system.
Despite the Court's apparent nostalgia for a dramatically
smaller national government, no judicially enforced federalism
doctrine is going to undo the last quarter of the nation's his-
tory. And while cases like New York, Lopez, and Printz may on
occasion stimulate important debate, such as the examination
of federal criminal law that has followed Lopez,391 they will
eds., 1994).
390. See Briffault, supra note 290, at 1350-53.
391. See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757 (1999); StevenD. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL.
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never have more than the most marginal relevance to the allo-
cation decisions that matter most. Those who truly believe in
the instrumental values of federalism should therefore focus
not on persuading courts to undo congressional "mistakes," but
rather on promoting wise institutional choice in the political
process.
L. REV. 643 (1997); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of
Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 247 (1997).
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